Vouchers Reconsidered -  The marketisation of education and prospects for social democratic reform by Rogers, Katren
 
 
 
Vouchers Reconsidered 
The marketisation of education and prospects 
for social democratic reform  
 
 
 
 
 
Katren Rogers 
University of Sydney 
 
  
 
 
 
Submitted as partial requirement for the degree of  
Bachelor of International and Global Studies (Honours),  
Political Economy, University of Sydney, 17 October 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other 
degree or diploma in any university, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, this 
thesis contains no material previously published or written by any other person except 
where due reference is made in the text of the thesis. 
 
 
1 
 
Contents 
List of Tables ..............................................................................................................2 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................3 
Introduction ................................................................................................................4 
1. Vouchers as publicly-directed consumption ...............................................................7 
Friedman’s vouchers, contested in time...................................................................................7 
Neoliberalism, and vouchers as the retreat of the state .........................................................10 
‘Actually existing neoliberalism’, and vouchers as publicly-directed consumption ............13 
2. Vouchers in theory ....................................................................................................17 
Neoclassical Welfarism .........................................................................................................17 
Libertarianism .......................................................................................................................21 
Equality of what (and what of equality?) ..............................................................................23 
3. Vouchers in practice .................................................................................................26 
United States of America ......................................................................................................26 
Sweden ..................................................................................................................................34 
The Netherlands ....................................................................................................................40 
Comparative insights .............................................................................................................44 
4. Vouchers reconsidered ..............................................................................................47 
The limitations of ‘Third Way’ vouchers ..............................................................................47 
Social democratic reformist vouchers ...................................................................................49 
Schooling policy alternatives and vested interests ................................................................53 
  Conclusion ...............................................................................................................56 
  Bibliography ............................................................................................................58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
List of Tables 
1.1  Friedman’s voucher proposal .................................................................................................8 
1.2  Jencks’ voucher proposal .......................................................................................................9 
3.1  Contemporary American education vouchers ......................................................................28 
3.2  Early open enrolment voucher schemes ...............................................................................29 
3.3  Swedish education vouchers .................................................................................................35 
3.4  Dutch education vouchers ....................................................................................................40 
3.5  International education voucher comparison  .......................................................................45 
4.1  Le Grand’s voucher proposal ...............................................................................................48 
4.2  Proposal for social democratic reformist education vouchers  ............................................50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Mum, Dad, Gwen, all my friends, and my little cat Buzz already know how much I love 
them and thank them for their support this year. I must make every effort here, however, 
to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Damien Cahill, for his invaluable guidance and 
undeserved attention in the year of his children’s birth.  
 
Thank you! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Introduction 
 
“[Education] is – without a doubt – an opportunity for the true use of the power of a 
human being, through cooperation between one person and another. This opportunity 
is an absolutely irreplaceable element in the development of knowledge or art; a 
development that is not focussed solely on individuals, nor on the groups and 
organisations – both small and large – that make up the state, but rather one focussed 
on society as a whole, viewed as a single body.” (Thorbecke, 2009 [1829]: 44) 
 
Education vouchers have been a highly controversial subject of welfare state policy debate in 
the last thirty years. Arguments have predominantly been waged between supporters of state 
education, and neoliberal advocates, with each side for the most part talking around the other. 
The sharp division between support for public and private provision has hampered pragmatic 
appraisals of specific policy arrangements, a still under-theorised area of inquiry to which this 
thesis contributes. This thesis seeks to deconstruct and recast vouchers as a potential policy tool 
for achieving social democratic goals. 
 
Vouchers are tied, demand-side subsidies, provided by government to parents or students to be 
used at the accredited public or private educational institution of their choice (Daniels & 
Trebilcock, 2005: 145). Milton Friedman is often depicted as the architect and icon of 
contemporary voucher schemes, but education vouchers long pre-date Friedman’s influential 
1955 treatise on the subject. The notion of a public subsidy to privately-provided education was 
advocated in principle by both Adam Smith and Thomas Paine (West, 1967), and voucher 
schemes existed in America as early as the 1870s in the states of Vermont and Maine. The 
voucher-like system of education funding in the Netherlands was inaugurated in 1917, and even 
as Friedman wrote in the mid-twentieth century, vouchers were used for a brief period in the 
southern states of America to organise ethnic segregation in schools. The long, varied history of 
education vouchers is not, however, depicted in most of the literature on the subject. Vouchers 
are overwhelmingly viewed as a neoliberal policy instrument entailing the retreat of the state 
from the provision of schooling. This has likely stemmed from the ideological and philosophical 
influence of Friedman’s utopian neoliberal vision.  
 
This thesis seeks to understand, in way which has not been previously pursued, the processes by 
which education vouchers have been constructed as a tool of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, a 
frame which describes the ongoing role of the state in the extension of market-oriented logics 
and the re-regulation of perceived-as-‘free’ markets (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). It takes the 
view that education vouchers are best understood, not as the retreat of the state, but rather as a 
form of ‘publicly-directed consumption’, wherein the state continues to actively shape the goals 
and outcomes of privately-provided schooling in the pursuit of particular social values 
(Valkama, Bailey & Elliot, 2010), depending on the character of regulation of voucher schemes. 
5 
 
The thesis conducts an international comparative study of education voucher schemes, which  
reveals that few education vouchers closely resemble the proposal outlined by Friedman, and 
that the outcomes of specific schemes vary significantly with different arrangements of state 
regulation and oversight. Considering the problems and prospects of education vouchers in 
theory and practice, a policy proposal is developed for social democratic reformist vouchers, to 
be implemented in unequal, highly neoliberalised nations such as the United States and 
Australia. 
 
Driving the analysis in this work is an historical institutional conception of economic 
development, which views the state, market, and society as inter-related and co-constitutive. It 
is argued that the neoclassical frame of analysis which has contributed to the depiction of 
vouchers as an efficiency-driven tool for increasing competition and decreasing government 
intervention in welfare provision is abstract and inadequate in its understanding of economic 
agency and change. Embodied in the political processes of neoliberalisation, neoclassical 
economics draws a separation between the state and the market, and an analytical trade-off 
between the goals of equality and efficiency, both of which are destructive of practical welfare 
state policy. This paper brings together the ideas of institutional ‘reconstitutive downward 
causation’ (Hodgson, 2000), and the ‘always-embedded’ nature of markets within society 
(Block, 2003), to contest the neoclassical view, positing an alternative understanding of welfare 
state policy as an embodiment of social values, and the market as an institutional tool in the 
process of welfare provision. This perspective informs a pragmatic appraisal of education 
vouchers as a potential tool for achieving social democratic policy goals. 
 
The proposal for social democratic reformist education vouchers which emerges from the 
analysis represents a strategic tool for egalitarian reform in nations where neoliberalism is 
significantly entrenched, both discursively and by vested interests. More than a spectre, the 
neoliberal poltergeist has changed the game for welfare economics. The path-dependent 
development of the residual liberal welfare state is resistant to radical structural change, calling 
for pragmatism and compromise in the tools of reform from the social democratic left. The 
future of the left in the highly neoliberalised nations of the world depends upon a strategic 
approach to policy-making which does not make the same analytical abstractions that view the 
state and the market as fundamentally, theoretically and politically, antithetical. Nevertheless, 
this paper does not support, and indeed actively opposes, the compromise in values which has 
underpinned Third Way responses to the challenge of entrenched neoliberalism, effectively 
amounting to an extension of neoliberal and fundamentally unequal premises. The goals of 
substantive equality of opportunity and freedom, toward more egalitarian outcomes, are 
essential to the vision of social democracy to which this paper subscribes. 
 
The paper proceeds in four sections, before a conclusion. The first chapter provides a review of 
the education voucher literature, summarising the debate between supporters and opponents, 
both of whom predominantly conceive of vouchers in terms of the retreat of the state. It 
advances the view of a more useful but still under-theorised scholarly treatment of vouchers, 
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which sees vouchers as a form of publicly-directed consumption, and goes on to extend this 
frame to understand the construction of vouchers as a tool of actually existing neoliberalism. 
 
The second chapter turns its attention to the influential voucher proposal advanced by Milton 
Friedman, challenging the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of his depiction. While 
few voucher schemes closely resemble the mechanics of Friedman’s policy, his normative 
justification of vouchers in terms of the positive externalities of widespread education has been 
mirrored by most contemporary advocates, and his limited, formal understanding of equality of 
opportunity has significantly influenced the construction of vouchers in the neoliberal era. The 
chapter questions the ideas which underpin Friedman’s influential legacy, confronting the 
analytical tools of neoclassical welfarism and libertarianism, and advancing instead the 
historical institutional approach, and the normative framework of positive liberty and 
substantive equality. 
 
Chapter 3 provides an international comparative study of voucher schemes in practice, in the 
United States of America, Sweden and the Netherlands. It shows that while very few voucher 
schemes simulate the mechanics of Friedman’s policy design, those which are informed by a 
limited conception of equality of opportunity fail to provide increased equality or freedom, and 
in some cases actually exacerbate existing socio-economic inequalities. The chapter 
demonstrates that the outcomes of voucher schemes vary significantly depending on the state’s 
direction of education through regulation and oversight, reflective of the philosophical and 
normative underpinnings of policy, as well as the historical institutional structures of different 
welfare states; liberal, social democratic, and conservative (see Esping-Anderson, 1990).  
 
The final chapter outlines the proposal for social democratic reformist education vouchers, 
designed according to the principles of positive liberty and substantive equality of opportunity, 
inverting the normative justification of Friedman’s vision. The chapter elaborates the 
inadequacies of Third Way approaches to welfare state policy and voucher scheme design in 
particular, and goes on to justify the alternative reformist vouchers presented as a strategic tool 
to be applied in nations such as the United States and Australia. The chapter recognises the 
merits of publicly-provided school choice alternatives, but advances social democratic reformist 
vouchers as most useful in nations where neoliberalism is significantly entrenched by path 
dependent welfare state development, shaped by policy drift and vested interests. 
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1. Vouchers as publicly-directed consumption 
In contemporary debates about education funding, vouchers are predominantly associated with 
the retreat of the state from the provision of education through the deregulation and privatisation 
of schooling, in accordance with their depiction in Milton Friedman’s market-fundamentalist 
vision. Proponents of vouchers tend to champion the efficiency improvements to be derived 
from a competitive market in education, while critics highlight the inequalities and social 
cleavages that arise from the privatisation or marketisation of public services. This conception 
of vouchers has only dominated the literature in the last twenty to thirty years, since the 
ascendance of neoliberalism as the dominant economic policy-making framework. In the 
nineteen-sixties and seventies, following Friedman’s contribution, the goals and design features 
of voucher schemes were still being contested. This thesis contributes to the still under-
theorised field which continues to contest the ideas that underpin education voucher systems, 
recognising the heterogeneity of voucher schemes, and questioning standing assumptions about 
policy design. Moreover, it seeks to understand the construction of education vouchers as a 
neoliberal policy instrument, in a way which has not been explored elsewhere in the literature. 
While vouchers have been debated primarily in terms of their theoretical neoliberal depiction, in 
practice they operate very differently. Crucially, the dominant conception of vouchers in terms 
of the retreat of the state obscures the significant ongoing role for governments in the creation 
and supervision of competitive markets in education. This dynamic is as true of education 
vouchers as it is of other neoliberal policies described nominally as privatisation or 
deregulation, but actually entailing a central role for the state in implementing and extending the 
reach of free market logics. An alternative way of thinking about voucher schemes, as systems 
of publically-directed consumption, recognises the ongoing institutional control exercised by 
governments over systematically-created markets in education, making way for a richer 
assessment of voucher schemes in terms of their theoretical foundations, and actual operation. 
This new perspective provides key insights for evaluating the prospects for voucher policy, 
beyond appraisals based merely on postulations of either market fundamentalism, or scepticism.  
 
Friedman’s vouchers, contested in time 
Milton Friedman’s (1955) education voucher proposal is now widely depicted as the most 
noteworthy definition of the voucher mechanism, instrumental in sparking contemporary 
debates about school choice. Its initial influence, however, was marginal at best, as then-
dominant economic understandings were resistant to the market fundamentalism that 
underpinned Friedman’s work. In the period 1960 to 1980 vouchers were viewed primarily as a 
tool for progressive educational reform, in particular in America as a component of the war on 
poverty (Brown, 2006). Friedman’s contribution was recognised, but not authoritative, at the 
time. 
 
Friedman’s exposition on the role of government in education is predicated on an ideological 
commitment to free exchange as a precondition for individual freedom, and a pretension to 
rectify the government monopoly over public schooling by simulating the conditions of an ideal 
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market. Friedman (1955) argues that by expanding consumer choice and demand-side influence 
on the market, quality of education for all can be enhanced by efficiency improvements which 
will not occur if education is provided directly by government. The expansion of consumer 
choice demands widespread access to a variety of providers, so all students are eligible for 
vouchers under Friedman’s scheme, and in order to establish a market of many competitive 
providers, few restrictions are placed on the supply of education. While Friedman (1955: 127) 
justifies government finance for schooling on account of the positive externalities of education, 
he contends that the decentralisation of decision-making and administration of schooling is 
central to achieving efficiency improvements. Regulation of minimum standards for safety and 
limited common content is described as the extent of government intervention in supply, and 
tuition fees are deregulated, allowing schools to set them at a level above the value of the 
voucher [See table 1.1]. Friedman perceives the flexibility gained from making teacher salaries 
responsive to market forces as one of the chief benefits of a decentralised, deregulated education 
market. The introduction of freedom of choice is considered equally as important as instilling 
the conditions for private innovation, and the ability of private providers to compete on price. 
Friedman’s vision of vouchers is consistent with his understanding of the government as a ‘rule-
maker’ in the process of market operation; defining and enforcing the legislative structures that 
support competitive markets, but not intervening to direct the distribution of resources in the 
economy (Friedman, 1982 [1962]: 25).  
 
Table 1.1 Friedman’s voucher proposal 
 
In the years after its publication, the deregulated voucher model which Friedman proposed was 
not accepted as writ, but rather considered as one of several possible voucher systems, the goals 
and logistics of which were substantially debated over in the United States. In fact, the first 
models to gain the attention of policy-makers were voucher schemes designed not to simulate 
the operations of an unfettered market, but to reduce inequality in educational achievement 
according to economic background and ethnicity. The 1966 Washington-commissioned 
‘Coleman Report’ on educational opportunity had found that private schools were 
outperforming public in integration and equality of educational attainment for black and white 
Student eligibility All elementary and secondary school students 
School eligibility All ‘approved’ schools 
Regulation of private schools 
Minimum safety standards, limited common 
curriculum 
Negotiation of teacher remuneration Individual teachers and schools 
Can schools charge additional fees? Yes, unlimited 
Can schools deny entry? Yes, on failure to pay fees 
Transport costs included? No 
How is information provided to 
parents? 
Schools market themselves 
Voucher value 
Less than or equal to per pupil public expenditure on 
state education 
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students (see Coleman, 1966). At the time, several scholars suggested compensatory voucher 
schemes, in which vouchers would be restricted to students from low-income households, or 
graduated in value so that poorer students received larger allocations of funding than wealthier 
ones (Jencks, 1966; Sizer & Whitten, 1968; Levin, 1968). Christopher Jencks, not Milton 
Friedman, was ‘the name most associated with vouchers’ (Mecklenburger & Hostrop, 1972: 
42). The Education Voucher Report by the Center for the Study of Public Policy, headed by 
Jencks, actually proposed seven general models for a potential voucher scheme, out of which 
Milton Friedman’s vision was considered the least favourable (Center for the Study of Public 
Policy, 1970). 
 
Table 1.2 Jencks’ voucher proposal 
 
Jencks became director of the Center at the time of the Education Voucher Report, following his 
own influential proposal for a voucher scheme. Jencks (1966) presents vouchers as a remedy for 
the ‘organisational sclerosis’ of the state education system, designed to encourage private 
initiative in provision, and give low-income students the opportunity to move out of ‘slum 
schools’ and into more mixed educational environments. Jencks favours the extension of 
regulations designed to put students on more equal footing, including school selection of 
students on a randomised basis to prevent the exclusion of poor or ‘difficult’ students, and the 
outlawing of additional school fees [See table 1.2]. Standardised testing would be conducted to 
set standards in common curriculum content, but schools would be relatively free to assess 
student performance and determine other aspects of the teaching environment, including teacher 
accreditation and remuneration (Center for the Study of Public Policy, 1970). While Jencks 
favours flexibility in this respect, other visionaries of compensatory models stress the 
importance of centrally-negotiated salaries for teachers, and the right of educators, as workers, 
to organise and strike (Sizer 1972 [1969]; Coons & Sugarman, 1978:170-6). This position is 
Student eligibility All elementary school students 
School eligibility All ‘approved’ schools  
Regulation of private 
schools 
Minimum safety standards, common curriculum and standardised 
testing, central review board for expulsion of students  
Negotiation of teacher 
remuneration 
Individual teachers and schools 
Can schools charge 
additional fees? 
No, but may seek subventions from churches or federal agencies 
Can schools deny entry? No, random selection for oversubscription 
Transport costs included? No 
How is information 
provided to parents? 
Central agency collates and disseminates information provided by 
schools (eg. size, facilities, teacher : pupil ratio, social 
composition) 
Voucher value 
Approximately equal to per pupil education spending on average; 
Vouchers graded to compensate low-income, disability, or special 
needs 
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cast in direct opposition to Friedman, who views union power as a hindrance to free exchange, 
inhibiting both freedom and efficiency (Kane, 2002). The experimental application of Jencks’ 
principles in the Alum Rock school district in San Jose, California, became so tempered by local 
political interests that it was restrained to include only public schools, and proffered negligible 
results (see Mecklenburger & Hostrop, 1972). However, the theory behind the program 
reflected a vision of vouchers as a tool for establishing equality of educational opportunity, not 
necessarily privatisation. 
 
Alternative voucher proposals are diverse, and divergent from Friedman’s vision. While 
Friedman also justifies vouchers in terms of equality of opportunity, his conception of equality 
differs from that of the architects of the compensatory voucher models. Friedman (1955: 129-
30) argues that education vouchers grant the less-well-off access to a choice of providers that is 
otherwise restricted to those who can afford to pay. However, Friedman’s flat-value vouchers 
are not designed to compensate for socio-economic disadvantage, and schools’ ability to charge 
unlimited fees of students beyond the voucher would uphold restricted access on account of 
income differentials. Chapter 2 will explore in greater detail the theoretical contradictions of the 
Friedmanite model, but it is important to mention here that the equality goals of Friedman’s 
scheme are substantially different from those presented in compensatory models. Arguments by 
the latter in favour of vouchers were driven not by a belief in the merits of a competitive market, 
but a desire to redress socio-economic disadvantage. Despite a perceived need for 
decentralisation, it was generally asserted that ‘the marketplace should not be the total arbiter of 
educational quality’ (Sizer, 1972 [1969]). Contrary to Friedman, most education voucher 
theorists were concerned with how vouchers could be used to promote equality of opportunity, 
not as a means of bringing into more effective play ‘the forces of the market’. The contestation 
of ideas about vouchers prior to the neoliberal era, and the circulation of voucher schemes quite 
different from that proposed by Friedman, allows us to draw a link between the rise of 
neoliberalism and the growing dominance of conceptions of vouchers in terms of Friedmanite 
privatisation and deregulation. 
 
Neoliberalism, and vouchers as the retreat of the state 
The ascension of neoliberalism as an economic ideology began to influence policy-making from 
the nineteen-eighties, in theory promoting a retreat of the state through policies of privatisation, 
deregulation and marketisation of public services. From around the same time, education 
vouchers became viewed primarily as a form of privatisation, predicated on the creation of a 
competitive, decentralised education market. Both proponents and critics since have tended to 
describe and debate vouchers in terms of the impact of free market competition on education, 
and the growing dominance of private over public provision. The sheer number of studies 
concerned with school choice that are dedicated to whether or not private schools generally 
outperform public (see Coleman, Hoffer & Kilgore, 1982; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hannaway, 
1991; Coulson, 1999; Alt & Peter, 2002) is in itself telling of the dominant conception of 
vouchers as a means for the market to take over provision of education from the state. A cursory 
explanation of some key theoretical contributions on vouchers in the last thirty years 
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demonstrates the pre-eminence of understandings of vouchers in terms of the retreat of the state. 
This section will elaborate this frame, with a view to highlighting its limitations. 
 
The pro-privatisation models of education vouchers begin, like much neoliberal discourse, with 
critiques of existing systems of public provision. Like Friedman, advocates of vouchers accept 
the necessity for state funding of education on grounds of positive externalities and market 
imperfections, but depict state and market logics as at odds with one another in the areas of 
administration and provision. Moreover, the private market is portrayed as fundamentally 
superior. Chubb & Moe (1990) view school choice through vouchers as a means of dismantling 
the cumbersome bureaucracy of state education. While they do not explicitly refer to their 
voucher proposal as a form of ‘privatisation’, the authors retain the fundamentals of Friedman’s 
implied logic of the retreat of the state. They argue that private schools are always more 
efficient than public, due to freedom from regulative controls and bureaucratic oversight, and 
that publically-administered schools would diminish under a voucher scheme, as private 
providers would compete on price for the provision of quality education. E. G. West (1991) 
makes a similar argument about the welfare costs of public education derived from the 
administration of taxation, and the power of unions. West supports vouchers as a relatively 
more efficient method of education provision, as a step toward the realisation of a ‘pure’, 
unregulated education market. Coulson (1999) uses centuries of international historical 
precedence to argue that private markets in education have long out-performed public provision 
in measures of equity and freedom, and presents vouchers as marketising reform to repair the 
last 150 years of ‘disappointment’ in the outcomes of state education. Hoxby (2003: 20-1) 
insists that vouchers produce the best results in societies which are most market-oriented, and 
expect least of their governments in terms of welfare provisioning. Embedded in these visions 
of vouchers as a means by which to re-structure and re-orient the education system toward the 
private market is the assumption, or expectation, that under a system of vouchers private 
providers will have room to innovate, demanding relatively little regulation of the supply of 
education. Furthermore, suppliers are expected to compete on price, implying the permissibility 
of fee deregulation, which imposes costs beyond the value of the voucher, so that – to some 
extent – the informative role of the price mechanism (upon which neoclassical theory depends) 
is upheld. These components, implying a gradual retreat of state schooling, take their lead from 
Friedman’s voucher proposal, and have come to dominate academic understandings of 
education vouchers. 
 
Even sceptics and opponents of vouchers have predominantly conceived of voucher schemes as 
entailing the retreat of the state. This perspective has tended to limit their critiques to warnings 
of the ill-effects of competition and the profit-motive on the social goals and equity concerns of 
education provision. Apple (1996; 2006) challenges market-driven policies of ‘conservative 
modernisation’ in the American education system, including vouchers, for their misdirection of 
funding and conference of undue risk and instability on individual parents and students. 
Vouchers are depicted as promoting the expansion of ‘unchecked’ free-market logic into 
everyday life, reproducing hierarchies of class and race. The implication therein is that while a 
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privatised market in education may be more responsive to individual choices and tastes, it also 
places problematic responsibility on individuals to make and pursue ‘good’ choices. This 
dynamic is said to be rationalised through the ‘apolitical’ nature of the market, and associated 
ideologies of self-help, which detract from the real implications of a reduction in government 
responsibility for social needs (Whitty, 1997: 58). Fuller & Elmore (1996) and Ball (2003: Ch. 
3) reiterate the likelihood of classed and racial segregation under vouchers, arguing that 
unfettered market competition restricts choice to certain individuals and groups, and affects the 
character of the choices available to different kinds of people. Theoretical critiques of education 
vouchers often pursue a defence of democratically-administered state education, in opposition to 
more problematic market provision through privatisation in the form of vouchers (Powers & 
Cookson, 1999; Cookson, 2004; Molnar, 2001). The effect is a polarised conception of the role 
of states and markets in the voucher literature. 
 
While the above authors are justified in highlighting the problematic impacts of vouchers on 
individual lives, social integration, and equality,1 the retreat of the state is too narrow a frame 
through which to view them. Understandings of vouchers as the retreat of the state are 
predicated on a theoretical separation of public and private provision which hampers practical 
appraisals of policy. This ‘false dichotomy’ between the (public) state and (private) market is 
problematic, because states and markets, in reality, form integrated parts of a social reality, co-
constituted by political and economic activities (Watson, 2005). It is widely recognised among 
institutional economists and economic historians that the market as a social system is 
underpinned by an ongoing process of production and reproduction by the state and other 
institutions, such as the legal system, as well as communal structures and norms (Polanyi, 2001 
[1944]: 140; Giddens, 1998: 15; Hodgson, 1998: 182; Block, 2000: 89-90; Wood, 2003, Ch.1; 
Watson, 2005:19-21). Advancing the interconnectedness of the state and market does not imply 
that states and markets should not be treated differently, at least for analytical purposes. Indeed, 
distinct logics can be identified in the operation of states which differentiate them from markets. 
The problem is not recognising the difference between the state and market, but rather the 
reification of this difference such that states and markets are conceived of as antithetical, 
demanding political (and theoretical) support exclusive of, or in priority over, the other. Instead, 
recognition of the real-world interaction between states and markets is essential for constructing 
critical appraisals of policy. 
 
Nicholas Barr (2004: 87-90) has identified the latent heterogeneity of neoliberal policies 
generally grouped under the umbrella of ‘privatisation’, as a result of the practical interaction 
between the state and the market. Barr argues that individual policies should be understood by 
differences in public or private imperative at the level of production, consumption and finance. 
Barr’s schema reveals the interaction between state and market, even in policies justified on 
neoliberal terms. Crucially, Barr suggests that different arrangements of state and market 
imperatives produce different policy outcomes. Despite the value of Barr’s schema, his 
                                                   
1 Chapters 2 and 3 explore problems such as these that emerge from particular kinds of voucher schemes 
in theory and practice. 
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classification of vouchers as dependent on private decisions about production and consumption, 
but public finance, oversimplifies voucher policies, consistent with the dominant understandings 
of voucher schemes as the retreat of the state. Voucher schemes are assumed to operate within 
the context of deregulation of production, where the state has no role in the provision of welfare 
goods beyond the dispensing of funds. 
 
The problem with understanding vouchers as the retreat of the state, where governments provide 
only finance, is that real-world manifestations of voucher schemes do not actually result in an 
idealised retreat of the state from production and consumption decisions, but rather a 
transformation of the state’s role. Instead of directly controlling the production and consumption 
of services, states provide extensive institutional and regulative support for deliberately-created 
private markets. The prevalence of this dynamic will be extensively demonstrated in a number 
of voucher schemes across The United States, the Netherlands, and Sweden in chapter 3.  
 
‘Actually existing neoliberalism’, and vouchers as publicly-directed consumption 
More constructive appraisals of education vouchers have emphasised the heterogeneity of 
voucher schemes, and the state’s ongoing role in directing the goals and determining the 
conditions of individuals’ ‘consumption’ of education. Authors in this vein are sometimes 
referred to as the ‘pragmatists’ of school choice debates, assessing vouchers alongside other 
means of provision in order to determine the best method for satisfying a set of socially-
determined educational goals (Valkama, Bailey & Elliot, 2010). This paper extends these 
perspectives using the frame of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, a concept which captures the 
utopian nature of neoliberal policies of privatisation and deregulation, supposed to ‘liberate’ 
free markets from state intervention, but actually characterised by intensified state activity in the 
imposition and extension of ‘free market’ logics (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). Vouchers are 
constructed as a neoliberal policy tool through the ideological and institutional embeddedness of 
neoliberal ways of thinking. Identifying this process gives us a clearer understanding of the 
problems that arise from the practical application of voucher schemes, and the reasons why 
Friedmanite vouchers do not deliver on their normative promises. Contextualising vouchers as 
publicly-directed, but, under neoliberalism, privately-oriented, also enhances our perspective on 
the possibilities for voucher policy, both within and beyond neoliberalising processes.  
 
Contrary to the dominant perception of vouchers in terms of the retreat of the state, theorists 
who view vouchers as a form of publicly-directed consumption argue that the goals and 
logistics of education voucher policies are deliberately directed by the state, according to 
socially-constructed value sets. Vouchers are best understood as a form of publicly-directed 
consumption, because unlike government transfers of income or cash, vouchers are not designed 
to redirect wealth for privately-determined consumption, but rather to stimulate or mandate the 
consumption of a particular good; in this case, education (Valkama, Bailey & Elliot, 2010: 235-
6). Vouchers in education have been used to navigate what Levin (2002: 162) has referred to as 
the ‘public-private dilemma’, arising from the tension between individuals’ private educational 
preferences and specific knowledge of the children in question, and the public role of education 
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for citizenship, achieved through integration and common experience (see also Daniels & 
Trebilcock, 2005: 145-8). Pragmatic assessments of voucher schemes argue that the balance of 
value placed on the public and private goals of education, in any given society, significantly 
influences the nature of school choice policies implemented by government, explaining the 
pursuit of rather different kinds of voucher schemes in different places. Levin (2001; 2002; 
Levin & Belfield, 2004; 2005: Ch. 1) has proposed that the design features of voucher schemes 
vary according to the relative value placed on freedom of choice, productive efficiency, equity, 
and social cohesion as policy goals. Levin argues that, through various arrangements of voucher 
finance, school and pupil regulation, and the dissemination of information and support services, 
governments are able to significantly direct both the production and consumption of education 
under voucher schemes. For example, if equity is valued in terms of a progressive redistribution 
of income and economic power, then in order to prevent the ‘cash-equivalent’ allocation of 
funding to simply subsidise wealthier families who previously afforded choice through private 
finance,  governments can and do pursue systems of finance where vouchers target the poor 
specifically, and implement multiple levels of school governance and compulsory parental 
participation, to promote accountability and a more equitable distribution of voice in shaping 
education. As will be demonstrated in chapter 3, these kinds of regulative mechanisms can be 
observed even in the United States, arguably the most neoliberalised nation in the world.  
 
In neoliberal theory, and in the Friedmanite vision of education vouchers, such forms of 
government regulation are considered interventions into the natural workings of the free market. 
However, as was argued above, in reality markets do not emerge naturally, but rather are 
constructed by states and other institutions. Contrary to the utopian claims of neoliberal theory, 
policies of privatisation and deregulation, including the mainstream depiction of vouchers, are 
never designed to make markets literally free from intervention. The state’s historic role in 
creating the conditions for market operation continues under neoliberalism, with policies of so-
called privatisation and deregulation almost universally combined with farther-reaching and 
higher levels of regulation which underpin them (Vogel, 1996; Stiglitz, 2000:11-12). Anderson 
(1999) argues that deregulation actually exists in the form of ‘re-regulation’, both of markets, to 
protect private profitability, and of society, to alter the framework of individual rights and 
marginalise values which conflict with profitability. Levi-Faur (2005:15) describes the 
neoliberal age of ‘regulatory capitalism’ as a characterised by ‘a new division of labour between 
state and society and in particular between state and business’, where ‘the state retains 
responsibility for steering, while business increasingly takes over the functions of service 
provision and technological innovation’. Levi-Faur’s study of 171 countries documents a clear 
connection between the implementation of policies of privatisation, and the rise of regulatory 
institutions and structures to monitor and direct market operations. In the neoliberal era, 
vouchers have been predominantly viewed as a means of ‘privatising’ education provision 
through the retreat of the state, but the way that policies have been implemented in practice 
reflects the transition of the state’s role, to new forms of publicly-directed but market-oriented 
regulation. Crucially, these forms of ‘pro-market re-regulation’ can sometimes represent a more 
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active direction of market operations by government, than traditional forms of intervention 
(Cerney, 2000). 
 
Neoliberal theory obscures the state’s active role in imposing the market-oriented logic of 
actually existing neoliberalism. While markets are never literally free, Chang (2002) argues that 
markets are interpreted as free (or unfree) based on the formal and informal institutional 
framework, and in particular the rights-obligations structure, of the society in which particular 
markets operate. For example, in neoliberal capitalist societies, immigration control is not 
generally considered to be an intervention in the labour market, but the regulation of minimum 
wages and working conditions often is. This is because, Chang (2002: 543-4) argues, the 
citizen’s right to control non-citizens’ access to work is privileged, but the worker’s right to 
contest their own conditions of work is not. To give an example in the context of an education 
voucher scheme; most theorists accept that the public dissemination of information about 
schools is a necessary precondition for free and fair choice to operate, but simultaneously view 
the centralised state assessment and evaluation of schools as an inefficiency, and a hindrance to 
private innovation (James, 1984; Chubb & Moe, 1990, E.G. West, 1991; Levin & Driver, 1997; 
Justesen, 2002). This indicates that while the right of individuals to make an informed choice is 
valued, the right of private providers to self-evaluate and operate without direct public oversight 
is privileged over and above it. Values sets such as these reflect the embeddedness of neoliberal 
ideology in social institutions, but, paradoxically, the legitimacy of neoliberal policy depends 
upon the ability of embedded neoliberal normative frameworks to obscure the interactions 
between the state, market, and society. 
 
Actually existing neoliberalism depends on social and political institutions not only for 
normative legitimacy, but for the practical operation of theoretically ‘free’ markets. Polanyi 
(2001 [1944]: 3, 76) theorised that the creation of an economy completely ‘disembedded’ from 
its social foundations was an impossible, utopian project, and that the tendency for markets to 
be ‘re-embedded’ through social protections was necessary for the prevention of systemic self-
destruction (See also Block, 2001). While some scholars have viewed Polanyi’s schema as 
drawing a theoretical separation between the economy and society, Block (2003) has argued that 
critics have missed Polanyi’s meaning, in ignorance of his personal development as a theorist. 
Block (2003: 300) suggests that the idea underlying Polanyi’s explanation is that of an ‘always 
embedded economy’ that can not be analysed without considering the state’s role in shaping 
‘actually existing economies’. Cahill (2012) extends the frame of embeddedness to suggest that 
neoliberalism is ‘always embedded in social structures, whether or not these [are] socially 
protective’. This view allows us to see that the states’s role in shaping actually existing 
neoliberal policies is essential for emulating the conditions of ideal markets, by privileging the 
market logics of competition and profitability in policy design. Markets depend on this process 
in order to operate. For example, vouchers work best when they are provided for the 
consumption of a product which is frequently purchased, so that consumers can learn from 
experience and send messages by rejecting particular producers. As education is a product 
purchased relatively infrequently (once or twice a year, for most users), then market information 
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must be disseminated by other means, either through marketing by producers (usually overseen 
by a regulatory body), or centrally by a government agency (Valkama, Bailey & Elliot, 2010: 
243-4; Daniels & Trebilcock, 2005: 152). However, while the availability of market information 
is essential for free exchange, the dissemination of information may be considered an inefficient 
use of resources in markets, and often advantages certain groups over others. Additional costs 
from marketing by producers, the administration of regulators, and the process of centralised 
communication, all reduce the productive efficiency of the system overall (Levin 2002: 160; 
Levin & Belfield, 2005: 140; Levin & Driver, 2007). This dynamic is representative of the 
internal contradictions of neoliberal theory. As well as obscuring the ongoing role of the state in 
applying neoliberalising processes,  
 
“whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets will generate an 
optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice has 
generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic 
intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales.” (Brenner & Theodore, 
2002: 352) 
 
Conclusion 
Understanding vouchers as the retreat of the state, and assessing them on the basis of whether 
public or private production is the best means of education provision, vastly over-simplifies the 
operation of voucher schemes in practice, and draws an unrealistic separation between the state 
and the market. Friedman’s (1955: 144) contention that education vouchers would see a 
‘sizeable reduction in the direct activities of government’ masks an important aspect of policy, 
in the state’s indirect activities in the provision of education, through regulation, oversight, and 
the direction of consumption. The frame of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ emphasises the 
state’s ongoing role in implementing and extending neoliberal logics, and allows us to 
understand how vouchers have been constructed as a neoliberal policy tool, enacted by the state, 
but privileging private imperatives over social goals. In order to consider the prospects for 
social democratic reform in highly neoliberalised nations, it is essential that we move beyond 
the utopian premises that derive from a philosophical separation of the state and the market. The 
next chapter will undertake a detailed critique of the theoretical foundations of Friedmanite 
vouchers, and demonstrate the internal contradictions of neoliberal ideology as expressed in the 
dominant conception of education vouchers. This allows the remainder of the paper to consider 
the practical operation of education voucher schemes in light of the alternative policy 
framework of substantive equality goals. 
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2. Vouchers in theory 
The dominant conception of education vouchers in terms of the retreat of the state has been 
significantly influenced by Friedman’s voucher scheme proposal. The previous chapter explored 
how this representation ignores the ongoing role for government in the regulation of education 
provision under vouchers, demonstrating that vouchers as a policy tool of ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’ differ from their theoretical imaginings. This chapter will probe the philosophical 
underpinnings of Friedman’s depiction of vouchers in order to expose the contradictions within 
his neoliberal approach, and the reasons why Friedmanite voucher schemes may have failed to 
meet their normative promises. In particular, the framework of negative liberty and a limited 
conception of ‘equality of opportunity’ make Friedmanite voucher schemes not only 
contradictory, but also impractical, as they overlook the interaction between state, market, and 
social processes, and real-world challenges to equality. 
 
Neoclassical Welfarism 
Neoliberal ideas about the role of the state which inform mainstream understandings of 
education vouchers derive primarily from neoclassical welfare economics, and the fundamental 
axioms of neoclassical theory that were established in the early marginalist works of W.S. 
Jevons, Leon Walras and Alfred Marshall. Arnsperger and Varafarkis (2006) describe this 
pervasive school as built upon the three tenets of methodological individualism, methodological 
instrumentalism, and methodological equilibration. Methodological individualism denotes that 
the individual is taken as the basic unit of analysis, from which all other analysis proceeds, 
implying a core belief in the primacy of the individual as an actor. Methodological 
instrumentalism assumes that all human behaviour results from the pursuit or fulfilment of 
individual preferences, and methodological equilibration describes the analysts’ presupposition 
of a state of aggregate equilibrium, to which outcomes are related either as congruent or deviant. 
These methodological principles lead neoclassical theory to depict the market as the most 
desirable means of welfare provision, and individuals as the only actors capable of making 
optimal choices in pursuit of their preferences (Stiglitz, 2000:59). An understanding of 
individuals’ behaviour as instrumental in nature leads to a conception of choices in terms of 
their contribution to Pareto optimality, describing a process of equilibration. The idea of Pareto 
optimality, or Pareto efficiency, is based on a utilitarian model of resource use which states that 
a system of production or allocation is efficient when society can no longer produce any more of 
one good without having less of another. Similarly, one individual can not be made better off 
without others becoming worse off, assuming resources are scarce (Barr, 2004: 98). 
Neoclassical economists argue that the privatisation of welfare provision makes Pareto 
improvements by allowing the forces of the market to mediate the many competing preferences 
of the ‘consumers’ of welfare goods (Stiglitz, 2000:57-60). When Neoclassical economists refer 
to ‘efficient’ outcomes, they conceive of efficiency in terms of Pareto optimality. Virtually all 
mainstream scholars recognise a limited role for the state in the provision of public goods; 
goods from which no one can be excluded, and for which the marginal cost of additional use is 
minimal or nil (Stiglitz, 2000: 80). The state’s role may also extend to poverty relief, which is 
usually depicted as best achieved by initial income transfers. These components of welfare are 
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considered as externalities to the market economy, and are theoretically separated from the 
process of equilibration. Beyond the provision of externalities, neoclassical theory posits that 
state intervention can never be justified in terms of improvements to efficiency (Barr, 2004:91). 
 
In the context of neoclassical welfare theory, Friedman’s support of education vouchers is 
somewhat anomalous. Friedman’s (1955) primary argument takes the neoclassical position that 
by expanding consumer choice and demand-side influence on the market, quality of education 
for all can be enhanced by efficiency improvements which will not occur if education is 
provided directly by government. This aim could, however, according to neoclassical theory, be 
achieved by privatisation of provision and finance, rather than a publicly-funded voucher 
scheme. In his discussion of social welfare measures more generally, Friedman (1982 [1962]: 
chs.11-12) advocates a negative income tax and cash transfers to alleviate poverty, rather than 
public provision or regulation, consistent with neoclassical recommendations. In contrast, 
Friedman (1955: 124-5) justifies government intervention in primary and secondary schooling 
on account of what he labels the ‘neighbourhood effects’ of education, in reference to the 
positive externalities derived from widespread general education. Government provision of 
welfare goods is usually only justified in neoclassical theory if the good or service is considered 
to be a public good. Although education can not be considered a public good in the neoclassical 
sense, as greater access certainly comes at greater cost, Friedman depicts education as a quasi-
public good, in which consumption should be facilitated but production marketised to improve 
efficiency of delivery. Vouchers are proposed as a way for governments to finance and ensure 
access to education, without directly providing it. The additional externalities and potential 
inefficiencies generated by government finance are considered to be less significant than the 
negative externalities caused by the under-consumption of education. 
 
Friedman’s justification of vouchers in neoclassical terms makes way for the theoretical 
construction of vouchers as a neoliberal policy instrument, where vouchers are viewed a useful 
tool for the retreat of the state in cases where full privatisation is not possible due to market 
externalities. The assumptions of neoclassical welfarism which most impact this depiction of 
education vouchers are the so-called ‘equality-efficiency trade-off’, and the assertion that all 
individuals possess subjective sets of preferences, exogenous from society. Education vouchers 
have consequently been imagined as efficiency-driven, and empowering of individual decision-
making through decentralisation and marketisation. 
 
The equality-efficiency trade-off 
The trade-off between equality and efficiency has dominated neoclassical explanations of 
welfare since the mid-nineteen-seventies. While the trade-off had not been popularised at the 
time that Friedman’s voucher proposal was first published, the fundamental elements of the 
trade-off, deriving from neoclassical visions of Pareto optimality, can be noted in his work from 
the fifties onwards. Given that neoclassical theory sees no efficiency grounds for state 
intervention, Okun (1975) formally proposes the equality-efficiency trade-off in an effort to 
explain the consequences of government action in the interests of equality, describing 
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government welfare transfers as a way of diversifying social risk by varying the mechanisms of 
distribution. The goals of equality and efficiency are seen to operate in a framework of scarcity, 
so that more efficient policies are seen to be necessarily less equitable, and more equitable 
policies less efficient. The logic of equilibration, that is, an assumption of full capacity 
equilibrium, applies to the trade-off itself. Okun (1975: 112) sets himself apart from economists 
who prioritise efficiency, a group of which he views Friedman as representative, by advancing 
the merits of in-kind transfers for ‘expanding the domain of rights and keeping the market in its 
place’, ergo addressing equality concerns at some expense to efficiency. He does, however, 
envision a limit to the equality goals that governments should pursue, where the impact on 
efficiency disproportionately outweighs equality gains. A similar logic is evident in Friedman’s 
(1955) discussion of the trade-off between the positive externalities of education and the 
negative externalities of government provision. The result in Friedman’s treatise is that minimal 
government intervention can be tolerated only in the pursuit of superior positive externalities 
which contribute to broader economic growth. Okun’s theorem has been interpreted similarly by 
other neoclassical economists, who extrapolate from the trade-off that the direct pursuit of 
equality goals, at the expense of government intervention, necessarily hampers growth (Arrow, 
1979; Browning & Johnson, 1984; Lindbeck, 1986). As will be elaborated later, Friedman’s 
limited conception of ‘equality of opportunity’ actually supports efficiency-driven voucher 
policies consistent with this interpretation of the equality-efficiency trade-off, but inconsistent 
with the real world complexities of design and implementation. Subsequent analyses of 
vouchers have focussed unduly on the perceived trade-off, struggling to reconcile the efficiency 
and equality goals of different voucher schemes (see Daniels & Trebilcock, 2005; Bjorklund et 
al, 2005). 
 
Rejecting the equality-efficiency trade-off as a fundamental tool of welfare economics is 
essential if we are to consider the goals of policy more substantively. This is not to deny that 
trade-offs exist in the design process of voucher schemes, sometimes between more equitable 
and more efficient strategies. Moreover, efficiency in terms of dollars outlaid is certainly a 
relevant concern for policy-makers. However, the analytical trade-off which implies that more 
efficient policies are always less equitable is restrictive and unsubstantiated. In response to the 
growing reluctance of governments to redistribute income in the 1970s, Thurow (1981) 
demonstrated empirically that there was no correlation between the degree of equality and 
growth performance in twelve OECD nations, rejecting the trade-off at a practical level on the 
basis that real world economies never operate at one hundred per cent capacity. Kenworthy 
(1995: 228) elaborates that while there is much clout to the argument that one hundred per cent 
equality of income would utterly eliminate efficiency incentives, one hundred per cent equality 
does not exist, and is not realistically pursued by governments. He argues that greater, if not one 
hundred per cent, equality actually boosts investment as a result of the interconnection between 
expectations and overall consumer demand. Kenworthy’s analysis demonstrates that between 
1974 and 1990, increasing inequality in OECD nations corresponded with lower levels of 
investment, and no relationship could be expressed between the level of equality and work 
participation. Other measures of economic success, including productivity growth and trade 
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performance, actually improved with higher levels of equality (Kenworthy, 1995: 237-43). 
Wilkinson and Picket (2010) have shown that greater inequality leads to higher levels of health 
and social problems, which arguably represent inefficiencies in the pursuit the greatest possible 
welfare for all. This evidence not only offers a potential justification for the pursuit of equality 
goals, but also undermines the utility of the equality-efficiency trade-off as an analytical tool. 
Moreover, the equality-efficiency trade-off distracts from other, more pertinent trade-offs in 
voucher scheme design which will be elaborated in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Individual preferences 
A further inadequacy of neoliberal welfare theory which impacts theoretical understandings of 
vouchers is the assumption that individuals possess subjective, exogenous sets of preferences or 
tastes, of which only they can possess knowledge, and act optimally upon. This assumption has 
driven justifications of vouchers in terms of public choice theory, in which the government is 
described as incapable of knowing or executing the will of individual citizens (see Schwartz, 
1994). The individual in neoclassical theory is separated from his or her social existence, and 
analysed as a rational, calculating, self-interested unit. Individuals’ interests are defined as the 
pursuit or maximisation of their tastes or preferences, and it is the satisfaction of interests by 
which utility, or welfare, is measured (Samuelson, 1983). This approach deliberately separates 
economic activity from its social context, and denies the real-world interaction between 
markets, states, and societies that was articulated in the previous chapter. 
 
The most potent criticisms of the assumption of exogenous preferences have come from 
scholars of social choice theory, who make a slight but important distinction between individual 
tastes, which are given, privately-oriented desires, and preferences, which are the set of tastes 
expressed in public decisions. Individuals are considered to have ‘preferences for preferences’; 
that is, they decide which tastes are relevant for them to express in their preference rankings, 
toward their opinion of social values, or the ‘general will’, rather than their personal interests 
(Arrow, 1963: 85; Goodin, 1986: 83; Sen, 2010: chs.14-15). Social choices are thus expressions 
of social values, made up of ‘laundered’, value-laden preferences, not individual interests. In 
neoclassical theory, education is primarily viewed as a private decision, contributing to an 
individual’s human capital, and financed by private income or by borrowing on future earnings. 
However, when education is funded by government through taxation, it becomes a public 
decision, in the interests of all individuals. Insights from social choice theory suggest that, under 
this circumstance, individual preferences can not be considered as exogenous, but rather are 
affected by processes of social interaction, and social decision-making as represented by 
governance. Thus, Friedman’s justification of state funding for education through vouchers, on 
neoclassical terms, contradicts with the assumption of exogenous preferences. This 
contradiction is obscured through the theoretical separation of economic activity and decision-
making from its social and institutional context in neoclassical theory, so that the impact of 
social interests upon individual preferences, and vice versa, is discounted.  
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The institutionalist perspective makes similar challenges to the assumption of exogenous 
preferences by evoking what Hodgson (2000) has referred to as ‘reconstitutive downward 
causation’; the impact of social institutions in shaping individual tastes and preferences. This 
process is ‘reconstitutive’ in the sense that, ‘there is both upward and downward causation; 
individuals create and change institutions, just as institutions mould and constrain individuals’ 
(Hodgson, 2000: 326). Individual preferences are not pre-determined, neither by given tastes 
and self-interest, nor the top-down influence of social context. Hodgson argues that, in contrast 
to the ahistorical maxims of neoclassical welfare economics, the institutionalist view is more 
historically and culturally sensitive to the real-world processes of individual and social 
evolution, and in particular to the idea of individual learning. Like social choice theorists, 
historical institutionalist scholars recognise an interaction between the social and the individual 
levels of agency and interest. Viewed as a form of publicly-directed consumption, vouchers are 
seen as a tool for navigating the interaction between public and private, or social and individual 
interests, in recognition of the social and institutional embeddedness of economic activity. This 
theoretical recognition of embeddedness is essential for understanding policy-making and its 
impact on individuals’ lives, in practice. 
 
Libertarianism 
Friedman’s vision of vouchers combines the neoclassical axioms of methodological 
individualism, instrumentalism, and equilibration, with an ideological commitment to 
libertarianism, which suggests that only economies predicated on free exchange satisfy the 
conditions for individual freedom (Friedman, 1982[1962]: 9-15). Libertarianism is based on an 
understanding of freedom in terms of what Isaiah Berlin (1958) refers to as ‘negative liberty’; 
an opposition toward barriers to action, privileging the maximum number of choice options 
available to an individual. Political and economic freedom is therefore conceived of as freedom 
from interference and coercion, by other individuals or the state.  
 
Friedman’s support for vouchers is doubly anomalous in the context of libertarianism, because 
vouchers funded by taxation are usually redistributive, and their nature as tied subsidies seems 
to violate Friedman’s preference for cash transfers over in-kind provision on grounds of 
paternalism (Friedman, 1982[1962]: 178). Libertarianism is traditionally at odds with 
paternalism, as it violates the principle of voluntary association, but Friedman justifies his 
support for vouchers by assigning privilege to the idea of ‘freedom of choice’, based on a 
conception of freedom in terms of negative liberty. The pursuit of negative liberty demands that 
the number of possible choices available to an individual is maximised, or arbitrary obstacles 
removed (Berlin, 1958). The idea of ‘free choice’, for Friedman, simply means liberation from 
the imposed or centralised decision-making of others. While vouchers may mandate the 
consumption of education, they do allow individuals greater choice among education providers. 
This element of choice is taken as normative justification for voucher schemes, despite the 
necessarily paternalistic nature of vouchers, as a policy which channel a portion of individual 
income into a particular expenditure. This leap of faith is enabled by Friedman’s justification of 
the state’s direction of funding, on grounds of the positive externalities of education. Friedman 
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frames this argument in terms of the enhanced negative liberty of the many other individuals in 
society who are less constrained by the deviant behaviour of the under-educated (Friedman, 
1982: 86). That is, even in recognising the wider social implications of economic activity, 
Friedman reduces his analysis to the individual level, fragmenting and disguising the interaction 
between the market, state, and society.  
 
The libertarian frame of negative liberty calls for the abstraction of the individual from his or 
her social surrounds, by placing value on the absence of barriers – social, institutional, or 
otherwise – to individual action, apart from the negative freedom of other individuals. This kind 
of abstraction, however, is both inaccurate and ineffectual. The frame of negative liberty does 
not allow us to understand markets, society, or the state, as it denies the fact that all economic 
activity, in reality, depends upon institutional coercion and barriers to action. Chang (2002: 548) 
argues that all markets are socially constructed, based on the formal and informal rights-
obligations structures of particular societies. That is, markets are dependent upon the kind of 
rights, such as the right to own property, and obligations, such as the obligation to pay one’s 
workers, that individuals and groups in societies possess. Friedman (1982[1962]: 25-7) 
concedes a role for the state in establishing, enforcing, and ‘umpiring’ such rules, but views the 
ideal rule-making role of the state as minimal, and predicated upon the creation of a formal, 
legal framework for free exchange. Chang (2002: 550) posits, however, that the ongoing 
creation and extension of markets significantly reconfigures the structures that underpin and 
define markets, by privileging different sets of rights and obligations. This dynamic is useful for 
understanding the way in which states direct consumption activities under voucher schemes. 
Vouchers can be said to convey particular rights and obligations to the holder, including the 
right to the service in question (the right to education), and some property rights over the 
voucher itself which denote the power to complain about or reject, through exit, a particular 
service provider (Valkama, Bailey and Elliot, 2010: 228; 246). While the former right is 
privileged under a system of direct public provision, the latter is not, and the additional right 
carries with it the obligation or responsibility to use, and not to misuse, the voucher. Moreover, 
vouchers bestow on producers the right to exchange vouchers for money from the issuer (the 
state), and the parallel obligation to accept funds in compliance with any regulations or 
requirements, stipulated by the state (Valkama, Bailey and Elliot, 2010: 247-8). These rights 
and obligations are dependent upon the formal and informal institutional structures of society, 
and are both constraining and constructive of individual behaviours and values (Chang, 2002: 
556). The constructive impact of institutions means that individual values and individual 
freedoms are always connected with social freedoms.  
 
An alternate understanding of freedom, in terms of positive liberty, emphasises social and 
individual freedoms and values as both co-existent and co-constitutive, and considers individual 
preferences as endogenous rather than exogenous and instrumental (Berlin, 1958; Sen, 2010: 
ch.14). The frame of positive liberty places value not upon freedom from barriers to action, but 
on the protection of basic human needs and capabilities (Sen, 2010: 309; Plant, 2003: 5). From 
this perspective, vouchers can be viewed as a means of directing consumption toward goods, 
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such as education, considered essential to the realisation of individual capabilities, rather than as 
efficiency-driven mechanisms designed to increase consumer sovereignty. The notion of 
positive liberty also allows us to explore the limitations to free individual choice, by recognising 
the structural inequities in the distribution of effective opportunities. In the frame of positive 
liberty, choice takes on a more complex role as a component of capability realisation, rather 
than simply a means to the end of instrumentalising one’s given preferences. Sen’s (2010: 235) 
capabilities approach to understanding freedom focuses upon ‘not just what a person actually 
ends up doing, but also on what she is in fact able to do, whether or not she chooses to make use 
of that opportunity’. Positive rather than negative liberty provides a superior normative 
foundation for the pursuit of more substantive freedom, and helps explain the practical 
challenges of voucher scheme implementation. Chapter 4 will draw from this frame of positive, 
rather than negative, liberty in its presentation of a model for social democratic reformist 
education voucher schemes to be applied in unequal, highly neoliberalised nations. The 
recognition in this frame of the socially-embedded nature of individual choices and freedoms 
offers a better perspective for analysis of the conditions of freedom, and the connection between 
freedom and equality. 
 
Equality of what (and what of equality)? 
In addition to his efficiency and liberty-based arguments for education vouchers, Friedman 
(1955: 129-30) also justifies the use of vouchers to enhance equality of opportunity, by 
suggesting that vouchers allow the less-well-off access to the choice of education provider that 
would otherwise be restricted to those who can afford to pay. Friedman’s conception of equality 
of opportunity is a limited, formal understanding, amounting effectively to ‘equality of 
treatment’. The extreme individualism of neoclassical and libertarian theory in combination 
depicts substantive equality as an imposition on freedom, and inequality as the sole 
responsibility of poorer individuals. As a secondary justification for vouchers, Friedmanite 
‘equality of opportunity’ advocates negligible gains to equality, and supports efficiency-driven 
policy. It does not seek to address the generational reproduction of disadvantage, nor the 
perpetuation of existing inequalities in the distribution of economic resources, which limit the 
opportunities of some to access expensive, high quality schooling under marketised voucher 
schemes. This limited conception of equality of opportunity has been disseminated through 
neoliberal rhetoric in the last thirty years, and many voucher schemes – especially in the United 
States – have been designed in subscription to these principles. However, the more substantive 
understandings of equality of opportunity which have informed education voucher schemes 
across the globe differ greatly from the limited vision of equality which underpins Friedman’s 
vouchers. Chapter 3 will explore these differences in practice, but it is important here to 
highlight the theoretical distinctions between different approaches to equality of opportunity, 
and their impact on the understandings and operation of voucher schemes. 
 
Equality of opportunity is a contested concept, but generally implies that all individuals should 
have an equal the chance to pursue their ambitions, free from discrimination. The Friedmanite, 
neoliberal position on equality of opportunity is limited, and does not seek to compensate for 
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systemic inequities such as socio-economic disadvantage. Friedman’s vouchers, characterised 
by fee deregulation and unlimited ‘topping-up’ of vouchers by wealthy families, are actually 
likely to grossly exacerbate socio-economic inequalities. Friedman’s proposal is designed to 
‘encourage a gradual move toward greater direct parental financing’, with less tax money used 
to fund education, but potentially more money spent on schooling overall, from individuals’ 
private resources (Friedman & Friedman, 1980: 162). Friedman is uninterested in the 
redistributive potential of vouchers funded by taxation, as, in line with the equality-efficiency 
trade-off, he believes that income differentials are essential to work incentives, efficiency 
improvements and economic growth (Friedman, 1982[1962]: ch.10).  
 
The limited understanding of equality of opportunity which informs this perspective is derived 
from a negative conception of liberty, wherein equality of opportunity is viewed as freedom 
from arbitrary obstacles to the pursuit of one’s ambitions (Friedman & Friedman, 1980: 132). 
These ‘arbitrary’ obstacles are formal, political obstacles. While Friedman (1982[1962]: ch.1) 
sees a connection between political and economic freedom, his conception of equality promotes 
formal, political freedoms and equal treatment under the law, but accepts and even promotes 
economic inequality. Friedman (1982[1962]: 195) defends, ‘a belief in the equality of men in 
one sense; in their inequality in another’; in ‘equality of rights’ on the one hand, but not in 
‘material’ economic equality. Libertarians argue that while short-term inequality is essential for 
work incentives and economic growth, formal freedoms breed long-term equality because 
positions of privilege are continuously contested by the social mobility of others (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1980: 148-9). This philosophy leads to policies based on equality of treatment, as 
formal freedom is viewed as the ultimate goal of policy. This is why Friedman’s voucher plan is 
characterised by universal vouchers of equal value for all students, regardless of socio-economic 
background, and relatively little regulation of production or consumption.  
 
Friedman’s understanding of equality, and its relationship with freedom, is fundamentally 
flawed. Friedmanite vouchers are both contradictory and impractical, as they fail to recognise 
that economic inequality is short-term and long-term, as well as generationally reproduced. 
Universal vouchers of equal value are ‘cash-equivalent’ for families who previously afforded 
school choice through private resources, and perpetuate economic inequality by advantaging 
these families. More educated parents are also better-equipped to make decisions about 
educational quality, and are more likely to make an ‘active’ school choice under a voucher 
scheme (James, 1984; Carnoy, 1998). The inter-generational reproduction of socio-economic 
inequality more generally has been widely identified in capitalist societies characterised by the 
existence of formal freedoms (see Wright, 2000; Lareau, 2002; Stilwell & Jordan, 2007). The 
problem is that formal freedoms, facilitating equality of treatment, ‘do not translate into 
effective freedoms’ (Cahill, 2012: 118, emphasis added). Persistent economic inequality leads to 
an inequitable distribution of power and voice in society, which restricts social mobility and 
individuals’ ability to pursue their ambitions. Moreover, the psychological internalisation of 
economic disadvantage leads to a down-shifting of individuals’ expectations for themselves, 
impacting their preferences and choices, especially with regard to education (Weinger, 1998; 
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Goldenburg et al, 2001; Elliott, 2008: ch.2). The formal economic freedoms championed by 
libertarianism are amplified in neoliberal discourse, and have the affect of disguising the 
effective un-freedom and systemic inequality that persists in contemporary capitalist 
democracies. Friedman’s voucher proposal is impractical in its claims to provide equality of 
opportunity, as the real-world dynamics of inequality under capitalism are deliberately ignored. 
 
Conclusion 
Friedman’s understanding of both liberty and equality are fundamentally flawed. The formal 
freedoms which are characteristic of Friedman’s limited conception of equality of opportunity 
lend themselves to efficiency-driven voucher schemes designed to gradually privatise the 
production and consumption of education, based on an ideological belief in the moral and 
economic superiority of the market. The previous chapter suggested that the voucher policies of 
actually existing neoliberalism differ substantially from the propositions of neoliberal theory, 
entailing a greater role for the state in the direction of consumption. This chapter has 
highlighted the contradictions and practical limitations of Friedmanite voucher schemes, and the 
next chapter will show that, despite the theoretical promise of freedom and equality, vouchers 
predicated on the Friedmanite philosophy of limited equality of opportunity have not and can 
not delivered on these normative aims. Moreover, the comparative study of education vouchers 
in America, Sweden and the Netherlands will highlight the common, ongoing role for the state 
in a number of quite different schemes. This makes way for the proposal for social democratic 
reformist vouchers in chapter 4, inspired by an alternative perspective which prioritises positive 
liberty and substantive equality, recasting education vouchers by inverting the normative 
framework that underpins the Friedmanite model. 
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3. Vouchers in practice 
Comparing the Unites States of America, Sweden and the Netherlands 
This chapter, engaged with the practical evidence on education vouchers, sets out to do three 
things. Firstly, it will demonstrate that despite the dominant understanding of vouchers in terms 
of the retreat of the state, in practice voucher schemes fit much better within the frame of 
‘publicly-directed consumption’, introduced in chapter 1, and are characterised by deliberate 
state involvement in the regulation and supervision of publicly-funded private markets in 
education. Secondly, it will suggest that voucher schemes reflecting the Friedmanite philosophy 
of limited equality of opportunity, critiqued in the previous chapter, fail to provide more equal 
access to education and may actually exacerbate existing socio-economic inequalities. Finally, it 
will argue that the character of the state’s regulation of education vouchers shapes the outcomes 
of particular policies, and that it is possible to design education voucher schemes that foster 
substantive equality; elevating individual capabilities over efficiency and limited, formal 
freedoms. These three goals will be addressed in an analysis and comparison of the evidence on 
education voucher schemes in the Unites States of America, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
chosen for their different approaches to voucher policy, and divergent histories as welfare states. 
The countries can be described as conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare states 
respectively, reflective of different social, political, and institutional characters which affect the 
goals of public policy and the values which underpin them. Liberal welfare states are 
characteristically residual, focussing on means-tested targeting and the private provision of 
services, social democratic welfare states are universal and egalitarian in the social benefits that 
they provide, and conservative welfare states are more absolutist, usually dominated by 
religious power (Esping-Anderson, 1990). These typologies aid in contextualising the 
international comparative analysis of voucher schemes which follows. Analyses of particular 
voucher schemes are regularly inconclusive due to the limited scope of many voucher 
‘experiments’ (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2005: 160-1; Levin, 2002: 167-8; Witte, 1998). The 
following international comparative study expands the scope of the investigation, revealing 
differences in the design and outcomes of voucher policies which offer important insights for 
the prospects for social democratic reformist vouchers.  
 
United States of America 
Education vouchers in the United States are perhaps the best known and most widely debated 
voucher schemes the world over, but the heterogeneity of schemes between states makes it 
challenging to provide a clear characterisation of American vouchers. Two open enrolment 
voucher schemes existed as early as the 1870s, and since 1990 various limited and targeted 
voucher programs have emerged in eight states and five individual cities and counties, including 
one funded directly by the federal government in Washington, DC (National School Boards 
Association, 2012). Few American voucher schemes closely resemble the proposal outlined by 
Friedman, but most share a philosophical commitment to limited equality of opportunity, and all 
demonstrate a far more active direction of education consumption by government than is 
depicted in common understandings of vouchers. This paper will focus primarily on the more 
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extensive voucher schemes, which reach at least 1% of the students in the state or city to which 
they apply [see table 3.1], with some reference to the open enrolment schemes in Vermont and 
Maine [see table 3.2]. It will explore the design features of these schemes, with reference to 
their foundation in political liberalism, and a formal notion of equality of opportunity, as well as 
their outcomes, including the degree to which they facilitate the integration of students from 
different socio-economic backgrounds. These various elements are plotted in tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
The limited nature of American education voucher schemes, usually applying to only a small 
portion of the student population, makes it difficult to draw clear-cut conclusions about their 
stand-alone outcomes, but taken together, it is possible to see that differences in the character of 
state regulation around vouchers produce divergent results, in regard to student performance, 
equity, and integration. 
 
Liberalism 
The Liberal foundations of America’s welfare state have shaped its education voucher policies 
in two contrasting ways. On the one hand, faith in individual responsibility, social mobility, and 
the value of innovation in the marketplace supports freer terms of production, while on the 
other, the dominance of secular ideology in institutional structures challenges the scope of 
vouchers schemes as applied to religious schools. Contestation around these ideas contributes to 
the diversity among American vouchers schemes, and their changing character over time. All 
American voucher schemes are characterised by fee deregulation and the individual negotiation 
of teacher salaries [see table 3.1], reflecting the individualist and market-oriented values which 
underpin policy, similar to Friedman’s vision. The Cleveland and Milwaukee schemes allow 
schools to charge fees to privately-paying students above the value of the voucher, but voucher 
students unable to pay the difference can not be rejected for failure to pay (Peterson et al, 1996: 
44). The fact that all American voucher schemes are capped at the current per-pupil expenditure 
on public education in their given locale demonstrates the Friedmanite belief underpinning these 
schemes; that existing private schools are both superior, and fundamentally more efficient, than 
public, if transferring the same, or often less, in public dollars to a private school is perceived as 
improving the lot of the children in question. With the exception of Washington DC, most new 
vouchers schemes confer minimal direct operational regulations upon private education 
providers. For example, in the voucher schemes of Ohio, Georgia, Utah and New Orleans (all 
inaugurated since 2005), schools are able to select and reject students at will, similar to the 
longer standing Florida scheme (National School Boards Association, 2012). Such policies are 
designed to create the conditions for mutually beneficial and voluntary exchange between 
producers and consumer of education, and more latently support profitability by allowing 
schools to ‘cream-skim’ the most preferable students who are easier, and cheaper, to teach. This 
reflects the state’s ongoing role, suggested in chapter 1, in constructing and extending market 
logics, and creating the very terms upon which ‘free’ market production is seen to depend. This 
role is characteristic of the processes of actually existing neoliberalism.  
 
 
 
28 
 
Table 3.1 Contemporary American education vouchers 
 
 
 
                                                   
2 Witte, 1998; Wolf, 2012.  
3Daniels & Trebilcock, 2005; National School Boards Association, 2012. 
4 Levin, 2002; National School Boards Association, 2012.  
5 Wolf et al, 2009. 
City/State 
(inaugurated) 
Milwaukee, WI 
(1990) 2 
Cleveland, OH 
(1995) 3 Florida (1998)
 4 Washington, DC (2004) 5 
Number of students  
(% student 
population) 
23 000 (25%) 5200 (7%) 21 000 (~1%) 1000 (~1%) [down from 1900 in 2007] 
Student eligibility 
Low income public 
school students K-
12; In 1990, 175% 
poverty line; in 2011, 
300% poverty line 
All students K-8; 
priority to low 
income background; 
25% of vouchers to 
current private 
school students 
Disadvantaged 
and disabled 
students in 
‘failing’ public 
schools 
Public school 
students K-12; up to 
185% poverty line 
School eligibility 
All private schools; 
religious schools 
included since 1998 
All private schools 
Secular private 
schools; 
religious schools 
excluded since 
2006 
All private schools 
Regulation of 
private schools 
Since 2011: 
Inspections, teacher 
accreditation, 
standardised testing 
and reporting 
Since 2000s: 
Achievement testing 
and (non-publicised) 
reporting to 
government 
No additional 
regulation 
Fiscal rules, central 
evaluation, 
inspections, and 
standardised testing. 
Negotiation of 
teacher 
remuneration 
Individual 
negotiation at the 
school level 
Individual 
negotiation at school 
level 
Individual 
negotiation at 
school level 
Individual 
negotiation at school 
level 
Can schools charge 
additional fees? 
Yes, but voucher 
students are exempt 
Yes, but voucher 
students are exempt Yes, unlimited Yes, unlimited 
Can schools deny 
entry? No, if below capacity No, if below capacity Yes Yes 
Transport costs 
included? No Yes, since 1998 No 
Yes, if school fees 
are below the value 
of the voucher 
How is information 
provided to 
parents? 
Schools market 
themselves. Test 
scores published 
since 2011. 
Schools market 
themselves 
Schools market 
themselves 
Schools market 
themselves 
Voucher value 
Equal to per-pupil 
funding for public 
schools or private 
school tuition 
(whichever is lower)  
~ $5000 
75-90% of private 
school tuition 
(depending on socio-
economic status)   
~ $3500 
Equal to per-
pupil funding for 
public schools, or 
private school 
tuition 
(whichever is 
lower)  ~ $6700 
Equal to per-pupil 
funding for public 
schools 
~$7500 
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Table 3.2 Early open enrolment voucher schemes 
 
Across all American voucher schemes, the government’s ongoing direction of education 
consumption is clearly evident in different policies on student eligibility and voucher value. 
Vouchers of higher value, such as those in Washington DC and Florida [see table 3.1], are 
designed to attract as many schools as possible and discourage ‘opting out’ of the system by 
private schools, limiting exclusion through fee levels (James, 1984: 612). Conversely, lower 
value vouchers, like Cleveland’s, may make voucher students less attractive to schools whose 
base fees are set at a higher level, although the lowest-income students are made more attractive 
as they attract a higher unit of funding. States enforce legislation of these design features, while 
subsidiary bodies oversee the application process for vouchers and their appropriate use in 
accredited private institutions. The liberal welfare state’s emphasis on means-tested targeting 
and private provision is not exclusive of, but rather clearly connected with, the state’s ongoing 
direction of the consumption of privately-provided education. 
 
                                                   
6 Vermont Independent School Association, 2012; Sternberg, 2001. 
7 Heller, 2001. 
 Vermont (1869)  6 Maine (1873) 7 
Number of Students  
(% student population) 6500 (6%) 
36 000 (55%) [6000 to private, 
30000 to public schools] 
Student eligibility 
Residence in town with no 
public school or a school too 
small to meet demand 
Residence in a town with no 
public school 
School eligibility 
Secular public and private 
schools; religious schools 
excluded since 1961 
Secular public and private 
schools; religious schools 
excluded since 1983 
Regulation of private 
schools 
Finance, staffing and safety 
rules, and standardised testing 
Standardised testing if 60% of 
students voucher funded 
Negotiation of teacher 
remuneration 
Salary schedules negotiated at 
district level 
Salary schedules negotiated at 
district level 
Can schools charge 
additional fees? Yes, unlimited Yes, unlimited 
Can schools deny entry? Yes Yes 
Transport costs included? Varies between towns No 
How is information 
provided to parents? 
Schools market themselves;  
Some towns allocate all 
students to a particular school 
Schools market themselves;  
Some towns allocate all 
students to a particular school 
Voucher value 
Equal or less than avg. per-
pupil funding for local public 
school: $5000-$7000 
80% of avg. per-pupil funding 
for public school ~ $6000 
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The impact of liberal secularism in American politics and society has had a contradictory effect 
on voucher scheme design, constraining rather than ‘freeing’ the terms of education supply. 
Interpretations of federal and state constitutions have made public funding of parochial 
institutions a highly controversial legal issue in the United States. The debate has centred 
primarily on whether or not providing subsidies to students attending religious schools 
constitutes support of religion, violating the constitutional separation of church and state. The 
very first American voucher schemes in Vermont and Maine applied to both public and private 
schools, of religious and secular persuasion, and were designed to fund the transfer of students 
from towns where demand for public schooling outstripped supply, to schools with extra 
capacity in nearby towns or districts (Heller, 2001; Sternberg, 2001). Religious schools were 
excluded after 1961 in Vermont and 1983 in Maine, following legal challenges. The Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program, inaugurated in 1990, initially offered students choice among only 
non-sectarian private schools, until a 1998 Wisconsin Supreme Court ruling approved the 
expansion of vouchers for use in private parochial schools (Witte, 1998: 231). The education 
voucher system enacted in Cleveland, Ohio in 1995 was harshly criticised for its inclusion of 
non-secular institutions, even after the Zelman vs Simmons-Harris Supreme Court ruling on the 
federal constitutionality of the scheme in 2002 (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2009: 162). The court 
determined that the voucher scheme was constitutional on grounds that the subsidies were 
directed at parents rather than the schools, they were religiously neutral, and sufficient secular 
school choices were available. Interestingly, Florida excluded religious schools from voucher 
funding in 2006, after a court deemed the scheme to be in conflict with the state’s constitutional 
commitment to uniform, religiously neutral public education. All the other schemes inaugurated 
since 2004 have allowed religious schools, although not uncontroversially (National School 
Boards Association, 2012). The limited nature of most voucher programs is explained in part by 
a need to counter widespread accusations of constitutional dubiousness with smaller-scale 
‘experiments’. 
 
Formal equality of opportunity 
The legal and ideological barriers to public funding of private schools have politicised and 
constricted the expansion of American voucher schemes, but education vouchers have also been 
limited in terms of student eligibility, devised to address equality of opportunity through means-
tested targeting of vouchers. The use of targeted, rather than universal, vouchers conflicts with 
Friedman’s 1955 schema, but the logic behind the systems’ design is drawn from the 
Friedmanite limited equality of opportunity rationale, with vouchers designed to give the less 
well-off  the ability to choose the private school education that is otherwise afforded by the 
better-off through private means. The institutional history of the United States’ welfare state 
development offers some insight into the pre-eminence of equity concerns in American voucher 
policy design. In the first years of the twentieth century, school funding and provision was 
decentralised into districts, causing a great spatial hierarchy of spending on education as local 
property taxes were used to fund local schools (Ritzen et al, 1997: 330). As a result, public 
schools with better reputations and better performance records are overwhelmingly concentrated 
in wealthier neighbourhoods. (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2009: 151). In America, voucher schemes 
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are presented as an answer to the spatial inequities that result from students being limited to a 
choice among public schools in their local district, so all schemes have been characterised by 
the free movement of students around the whole of the voucher-specific area. 
 
The use of targeted vouchers for financially disadvantaged, disabled or special needs students, 
has been the starting point for nearly all American voucher ‘experiments’. The Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program initially limited eligibility to students whose families earned below 
175% of the federal poverty guideline, and vouchers were only granted to 1% of the public 
school student population (Witte, 1998: 231). This has since been extended to an unlimited 
proportion of students from families of earnings up to 300% of the poverty line [see table 3.1]. 
No discrimination is exercised on ground of race, ethnicity or prior performance, and 
oversubscription for voucher places is decided by lot. Florida’s state-wide voucher scheme, 
enacted in 1999, offers vouchers to disadvantaged children and children with disabilities in 
‘failing’ public schools, rather than being directly means-tested (Levin, 2002: 163). Cleveland’s 
school vouchers target low socio-economic background applicants with higher value vouchers, 
and are limited in their cash-equivalency so that only 25% of vouchers can be collected by 
students currently attending private schools (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2009: 170). The gradual 
expansion of the Milwaukee scheme, now funding 23 000 students, demonstrates the 
development from trial program to more extensive scheme, which other programs are expected 
to follow (Wolf, 2012).  
 
Outcomes 
American voucher schemes have been designed to lift disadvantaged students into superior 
learning environments, but the success of these schemes in improving student performance and 
educational attainment has been widely contested. In both Cleveland and Milwaukee, voucher 
students in private schools have been recorded in a number of studies as performing better than 
their public counterparts (Greene et al, 1996; Rouse, 1998; Peterson et al, 1999). However, 
other studies have argued that, when adjusted to reflect students’ socio-economic background, 
the difference in achievement is negligible or voided (Carnoy, 1998: 313; Witte, 1998: 238). 
One ongoing study of the Milwaukee voucher program found that voucher students, adjusting 
for socio-economic disadvantage, performed better, but only in the 2010-11 school year. It also 
found that the most economically disadvantaged students continually ranked amongst the 
poorest performers in both public and private schools (Wolf, 2012). Similarly, in Washington 
DC, voucher recipients overall made improvements in reading ability, but relatively 
disadvantaged groups made no significant progress (Wolf et al, 2009). Cleveland presented an 
interesting result, with performance gains for voucher students attending private schools 
marginally better overall, but significantly improved for African American students, considered 
among the most disadvantaged (Greene, 2001). This result could be attributed to the higher 
value voucher offered to the poorest students, making them more attractive to more desirable 
private schools. A clear advantage of all American voucher schemes has been the consistent 
finding that the majority of both parents and students who take up vouchers are more satisfied 
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with their new schools compared with their previous ones (Greene et al, 1996; Witte, 1998; 
Peterson et al, 1999; Levin, 2002; Wolf et al, 2009; Wolf, 2012). 
 
America’s limited voucher schemes have arguably resulted in welfare improvements for the 
individual families who take up targeted vouchers, but their overall impact represents an 
insufficient response to more systemic inequities. This broadly reflects the programs’ design 
according to the Friedmanite logic of limited, formal equality of opportunity. School choice 
schemes tend generally to unevenly favour higher income groups as a result of the search costs 
involved with seeking information about schools, as the basis for choice, and transportation of 
children to a more distant but possibly preferable school (Carnoy, 1998: 311-2; Levin, 2002: 
167). The American solution of limiting vouchers to a targeted group of low income families 
does not wholly rectify this dynamic, as other elements of policy design fail to challenge 
existing inequality. As American schemes are designed to move disadvantaged students out of 
the public sector, there is some suggestion that school selection of students through ‘cream-
skimming’, or out-pricing due to the deregulation of fees, can lead to the further demise of 
public schools, left with simultaneously poor, disadvantaged, and less-able cohorts (Daniels & 
Trebilcock, 2005: 150-5). The exemption of voucher students from additional fee payments in 
Milwaukee and Cleveland tempers this impact. The ongoing study of the Milwaukee voucher 
program has revealed an overall improvement in student performance in both the public and 
private sectors, despite a $52 million fiscal-year saving in state education expenditure, which 
may discredit the assertion of ‘cream-skimming’ in this case (Wolf, 2012). Little published 
evidence exists comparing the performance of public and private schools under other American 
voucher schemes. 
 
Although evidence of cream-skimming in the United States is inconclusive, there is a clear 
indication of consumer ‘self-selection’ in school choice. Supporters of vouchers have admitted 
that ‘they probably attract the more capable of the disadvantaged poor’ (Greene, 2001: 135). For 
example, families who applied for school vouchers in Milwaukee were all classed as low-
income-earners, but comprised of parents who had a higher average level of education than the 
low-income parents of public school students broadly. 52% of voucher parents had had some 
college education, compared with only 30% of parents of all public school students, and twice 
the proportion of the former group were college graduates; rates of 9% and 4% respectively 
(Witte, 1998: 234). This dynamic indicates the potential for an inter-generational reproduction 
of disadvantage in children of less educated parents, less likely to take up vouchers. Evidence of 
‘self-sorting’ has also been noted in the Washington DC program, where one of the primary 
reasons parents declined to take up vouchers (after a lack of space in the desired school) was a 
lack of special needs assistance in the schools available, especially a lack of English language 
learning programs (Wolf et al, 2009: 23, 57, 64). These issues raise the concern that existing 
private schools may be as unresponsive to student needs and tastes as existing public schools. 
Some have argued that it may be necessary to subsidise or incentivise the creation of new 
schools to rectify this problem (Peterson et al, 1996). In both Sweden and the Netherlands, the 
creation of new schools and adaption of current schools has been a focus of policy, as will be 
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explored below. While vouchers in the USA are formally available to all low-income students, 
reflecting equality of treatment, in practice existing inequalities create barriers to equal access, 
and produce a very limited version of equality of opportunity. 
 
Integration 
One indicator of a more equal uptake of the opportunities for choice is the level of socio-
economic integration present in schools substantially comprised of voucher students. Wilkinson 
and Pickett (2010: 163-6) have argued that social exclusion leads to a greater divide between 
‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ tastes, which contributes to the internalisation of social hierarchy and 
difference into individuals’ preferences and self expectations. Greater social integration in 
schools helps break down these cultural hierarchies and discriminatory tastes that act to 
exacerbate economic inequalities. As noted above, the primary obstacles to the uptake of 
vouchers for poorer families are the additional search and transportation costs associated with 
school choice. The Cleveland voucher scheme, which covers the additional cost of 
transportation of students to more distant schools, has resulted in greater social and ethnic 
integration in the schools with the largest numbers of voucher students, more reflective of the 
demographic mix of the Cleveland area than pre-existing public or private schools (Daniels & 
Trebilcock, 2005: 161). The Milwaukee scheme, which does not subsidise transportation [see 
table 3.1], has had no effect on pre-existing segregation (Wolf, 2012). In the Vermont voucher 
system [see table 3.2], regulation of transportation is decentralised, with some towns electing to 
provide publically-funded buses, and others placing the onus on parents to cover the cost. This 
system is celebrated by some for the efficiency improvements derived from community and 
individuals’ cost-saving innovations in transportation, such as car pooling (Sternberg, 2001). 
Levels of integration, however, are difficult to measure as a result of the relative homogeneity 
of Vermont population.  
 
The Cleveland and Milwaukee schemes are quite similar, apart from the inclusion of transport 
costs in Cleveland, and the higher level voucher offered for the poorest students. This suggests 
that the different result with regard to socio-economic integration could be attributed to the 
state’s responsibility for the additional cost, beyond tuition, of active school choice away from 
the local neighbourhood, as well as the incentive to private schools to take in the poorest 
students. This confers more substantive opportunities upon children from the poorest 
households, who are also often over-represented in ethnic minorities. The significance of 
subsidised transportation and other search costs can not be taken alone in this case. It is 
important to remember that, due to the low level of the Cleveland voucher subsidy, schools 
largely comprised of voucher students tend to be the lower-cost private schools in the area, 
complemented by a number of expensive schools with lower numbers of voucher students and 
levels of socio-economic integration (Levin, 2002). The role of search costs in promoting 
integration will be further explored below with reference to Swedish and Dutch school choice 
programs. 
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Cleary, the character of regulation in America’s longest running education voucher schemes is 
very different between programs, and starkly different from Friedman’s 1955 proposal. While 
some social integration and improved performance for disadvantaged groups has been observed, 
particularly in the Cleveland scheme, overall the effectiveness of most programs is limited in 
addressing systemic inequality. This is not surprising, given the foundation of most schemes in 
a limited, formal vision of equality of opportunity, derived from Friedmanite ideas. While the 
schemes may be considered to confer equality of treatment upon individuals whose financial 
resources are insufficient to afford private education, the evidence of self-selection and ongoing 
under-performance of the poorest and most disadvantaged groups indicates that these schemes 
have not amounted to increased freedom, and in most cases offer a limited version of choice for 
recipients. Proponents of school choice in the United States are quick to argue that, until more 
extensive voucher programs are trialled and studied, it is impossible to know whether the results 
of limited programs will be replicated, and what kinds of regulation may be necessary to combat 
segregation and inequality (Hill & Guin, 2002: 46). However, the positive results in Cleveland 
indicate that policies which address search costs and make the poorest groups most attractive to 
private schools may promote greater integration and more substantive equality. The limited 
scheme in Cleveland can not be taken alone, but a comparison of the limited United States 
experience with international voucher programs offers a broader perspective which help to 
substantiate these conclusions, and inform the possibilities for progressive reform. It is essential 
to identify these problems and prospects now, while existing American voucher schemes, 
including seven new programs inaugurated since 2011, begin to rapidly expand. 
 
Sweden 
Prior to the introduction of vouchers, Sweden had a highly centralised, universal, high standard 
state education system, in line with its history as a social democratic, largely socialised welfare 
state. Schools were funded directly by the national government, and students were assigned to 
attend their local public school. Vouchers in education were implemented as part of the wave of 
decentralisation of public services stemming from the introduction of allowances in the Local 
Government Act of 1992 for municipalities to provide public finance for private provision of 
services. Education vouchers were justified on grounds of making schooling more receptive to 
student and parental preferences (Bjorklund et al, 2005: 7-8). The voucher program is nation-
wide, but administered by the municipalities, so levels of voucher value and rules about 
enrolment vary slightly between regions. All private schools, known as ‘free’ schools by virtue 
of their freedom from state direction of teaching, are eligible for vouchers, including for-profit 
and religious schools. There is no academic streaming in the compulsory years of schooling, 
from age 7 to 15, unlike most nearby central European nations, including the Netherlands 
(Wiborg, 2010: 18). The design features of Swedish education vouchers are described in table 
3.3. The Swedish experience of education vouchers has been viewed in the context of the 
neoliberalisation of the Swedish state, and the softening of social democratic values. However, 
it is also clear that the nation’s social democratic history and commitment to egalitarianism has 
significantly shaped its voucher policy design and their outcomes. This section will consider the 
influence of social democratic values and egalitarianism upon Swedish voucher scheme design, 
35 
 
as well as the ways in which the state has actively created a private market in education, and the 
outcomes of education vouchers in Sweden. 
 
Table 3.3 Swedish education vouchers 
Student Eligibility Universal; all compulsory-schooling-aged students (7-16) 
School Eligibility All public and private schools; some municipalities enforce residential admission zones for schools 
Regulation of Private schools National ‘goal-setting’, municipal inspections, standardised testing in final compulsory year 
Negotiation of teacher 
remuneration Individual negotiation at the school level 
Can schools charge 
additional fees? No 
Can schools deny entry? Some; in Stockholm and for ‘profile’ schools 
Transport costs included? No 
How is information provided 
to parents? School self-assessment and reporting, public dissemination 
Voucher value Standardised, flat-rate within municipalities 
 
Social Democracy 
In chapter 1 and 2, vouchers, viewed as publicly-directed consumption, were described as a tool 
for addressing the perceived tension between individual tastes and social values. While it was 
implied that the process of institutional ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ renders these goals 
less exclusive of one another than some authors suggest, it is important to recognise that the 
ways in which individual and social goals interact differ in different ideological and institutional 
contexts. The social value of a common educational experience is likely more significant in 
social democracies such as Sweden, than in liberal welfare states like America. It is surprising, 
then, that Sweden’s education reforms of the last twenty years have been characterised by a 
desire to diversify primary and secondary education. The evidence indicates a vacillating period 
in Sweden, characterised by both change and continuation of social democratic values. 
 
There are two dominant perspectives on the reasons for the introduction of school choice in 
Sweden. Some authors view the reforms as the result of an invasion of Swedish egalitarianism 
by neoliberal ideas from the 1970s and 80s, leading not only to the growing influence of 
conservative and liberal political parties, but a general distaste for the hefty public sector, since 
viewed as bureaucratic and inefficient (Carnoy, 1998: 335; Wiborg, 2010: 9). Others have 
described the change as a process of institutional development and legitimisation, whereby 
Swedish social democrats identified that in light of the increasingly individualist centre of 
democratic ideas, the presence of universal tax-funded welfare services that did not meet 
taxpayer tastes represented a threat to the legitimacy of the regime (Aasen, 2003: 125-6; 
Klitgaard, 2007: 182). By either interpretation, it is clear that the introduction of school 
vouchers, along with other changes to the provision of public services around the same time, 
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reflect a shift in official and possibly popular conceptions of social democratic governance in 
Sweden, in line with worldwide neoliberalising processes. 
 
The impact of changing ideals upon the outcomes of the school voucher scheme can be 
observed in the experience of Swedish teachers in the decentralised funding system. While 
teacher salaries and employment conditions were still negotiated centrally in the initial reforms, 
from 1995 these decisions were decentralised to the level of individual schools, as noted in table 
3.3 (Bjorklund et al, 2005: 12-3). In practice, due to the history of collectivisation, unions still 
worked as a bloc in negotiations and pattern bargained with schools in particular municipalities 
(Carnoy, 1998: 331). However, in the last decade, a gradual decline in wages and growing 
instability of working conditions has been met with a decline in the number of graduate 
teachers, causing some concern about the future of educational standards, class sizes and teacher 
quality (Bjorklund, et al, 2005: 173-4). While decentralisation is seen as enhancing democracy 
by the centrist designers of the 1992 reforms, the character of regulative change has 
undervalued teaching as a welfare service, and the marketisation of remuneration may lead to 
significantly less equal outcomes. This process is clearly connected with the structure of the 
Swedish education system, and the design of its education vouchers. 
 
The continuation of social democratic values in individual preferences is reflected in the choice 
of schools, by students and parents, under the voucher system. While parental awareness of the 
voucher system and active school choice was initially low (Carnoy, 1998), the number of 
private, or ‘free’, schools in Sweden has rapidly grown under the scheme, from only 60 in 1991, 
to 709 in 2010 (Wiborg, 2010: 11). Most of these schools, however, are non-denominational, 
competing with public schools for similar students, with most of the population preferring a 
more general, non-religious approach to schooling (Sandstrom & Bergstrom, 2005: 352). This 
suggests that individual preferences are relatively homogeneous in Sweden, or at the very least, 
that parents see some value in a shared educational experience. However, there is still some 
evidence of active school choice being made in Sweden. While free schools cater to a relatively 
low portion of the student population, between 0 and 25% depending on the municipality, it is 
roughly twice as common for students to choose to attend a public school other than their 
formerly-designated local one (Bjorklund et al, 2005: 116). Unfortunately this group of students 
is relatively under-studied compared to those who choose a free school, but it indicates that 
participation in active school choice is much higher than the free school attendance figures 
suggest. 
 
Egalitarianism and equality 
The egalitarian principles of Swedish social democracy have long shaped an education system 
designed according to equality of outcome, to minimise inequality and eradicate socio-economic 
disadvantage (Bjorklund et al, 2005: 7). The universal, flat-rate value of Swedish vouchers 
reflects these egalitarian principles [see table 3.3]. School spending varies between 
municipalities, but there is no discrimination in the per-pupil allocation between public and 
private school within municipalities. Like the anti-discrimination laws which govern school 
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admissions in the United States, religion and ethnicity are not considered legal grounds for 
refused entry of students. Student ability and previous performance is also excluded, except in 
the municipality of Stockholm, and for entry into ‘profile schools’ for students who are gifted or 
particularly interested in areas such as music, performance, or technology (Sandstrom & 
Bergstrom, 2005: 356). State direction of education provision under the Swedish system is more 
direct on the supply side than in the American case. Shortly after the introduction of 
decentralisation and voucher funding, national government re-regulation in the form of the 
Education Act of 1994 prevented all schools from charging fees to students beyond the value of 
the voucher, and subjected free schools to inspection by municipal bodies. Moreover, it 
instituted the expectation that free schools would offer the same ancillary services, such as 
home language instruction for immigrants, and student health services, which had previously 
been limited to public schools (Carnoy, 1998: 335; Wiborg, 2010: 10). This direct legislative 
approach, unlike the consumption-directed approach of American voucher schemes, reflects 
Sweden’s history as a social democratic welfare state, in contract to America’s liberal regime. 
 
Creating Markets 
As noted above, the move toward a decentralised voucher-funded education system was part of 
the neoliberalisation of welfare services in Sweden, entailing a deliberate marketisation of 
schooling. In this process, the Swedish state created the conditions for market operation by 
encouraging both the establishment of new schools, to foster diversity, innovation, and 
responsiveness to individuals’ tastes, as well as the spread of information about schools, so that 
consumers of education could make informed decisions about providers. While schools were 
quite heavily regulated in the fashion described above, they retained control over student 
assessment and grading, teaching hours, and teaching methods, in order to encourage innovation 
(OECD, 1994: 81). Since 1990, the number of free schools in Sweden has dramatically 
increased, from only a handful to around a quarter of all schools in the nation, while the average 
proportion of students in compulsory schooling enrolled in free schools has increased tenfold, 
from less than 1% to about 9% (Swedish Association of Independent Schools, 2009). This small 
but significantly increased share has been facilitated by the relative ease of opening new schools 
to cater for particular needs or tastes. For example, in the mid-1990s, frustration with the 
programs and facilities in current schools led a group of parents of disabled students to open 
their own school (Carnoy, 1998: 334). The Swedish national government directly oversees the 
creation of new schools, through an approval process by the National Agency for Education in 
which schools must justify their compliance with the national goals of compulsory schooling 
(OECD, 1994: 79). Since 2008, municipal governments have exercised more control over 
whether a new school is established, based on the potential consequences for the local school 
system as a whole (Wiborg, 2010: 17). That is, while an increase in the number of providers, 
catering to smaller numbers of more specific students, is encouraged, new schools which may 
draw too many students from existing schools, where there is no increased demand, can be 
rejected. The growth of, and limits upon, marketisation are deliberately controlled in the 
Swedish voucher system. 
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The marketisation of education provision has also entailed the dissemination of new market 
information about school character and performance, by both schools and government bodies. 
In 1993, only 75% of parents had heard of the recent school reforms, and only 47% felt they 
were well-informed about the new process (OECD, 1994: 82). By the school year 1993-4, 
schools had actively started to market themselves to parents by creating advertisements and 
brochures directed at prospective students. This process was later enforced in the form of 
performance reporting, although the public dissemination of information remains complicated 
by school self-evaluation processes [see table 3.3], which means that different schools grade 
students in uneven and unequal ways. Moreover, students of free schools only undergo 
standardised testing in the final year of compulsory schooling. Some commentators advocate an 
increase in standardised testing and centralised evaluation to mediate this process (Bjorklund et 
al, 2010: 175-6). Central dissemination is intended to equalise the search costs associated with 
school choice, so that parents and students are equally well informed about their school choice 
options. However, as was noted in chapter 1, the dissemination of market information may be 
interpreted as an inefficient misdirection of government resources away from schooling (Levin 
& Belfield, 2005: 140; Levin & Driver, 2007). The pertinent trade-off in this situation is 
whether private or public resources are used to cover these search costs, essential to the creation 
and operation of markets. If having students attend schools which are more suited to their needs 
represents a more efficient state of affairs, then assuring that unbiased information is available 
to parents and students, even at greater cost to government, might not be considered inefficient. 
In contrast, the use of private resources (both of producing schools and of consuming families) 
may lead to the uneven transmission of information due to income differentials, and 
misrepresentations by schools in the interest of commercial gain. Such issues reflect the difficult 
trade-offs associated with voucher design, which go beyond the analytical equality-efficiency 
trade-off which was disputed in chapter 2. They also bring out the contradictions of actually 
existing neoliberalism, as governments are faced with new forms of ‘market imperfections’. The 
Swedish government has prioritised equal access to information in the interests of 
egalitarianism, in contrast with the American voucher schemes which relegate these search costs 
to the private realm, outside the reach of formal equality. 
 
Outcomes 
The outcomes of Swedish education vouchers offer a more interesting test of the voucher 
mechanism than the limited schemes in the United States, as the national scope of the Swedish 
scheme has made significant systemic changes to the pre-existing model of education funding. 
The performance outcomes of the Swedish scheme, however, have been equally debated. 
Studies have observed a small increase in educational attainment and achievement in students of 
free schools, as well as improvement in national English and mathematics tests in public schools 
which experienced competition from free schools in the local area (Sandstrom & Bergstrom, 
2005: 355; Wiborg, 2010: 13-4). Considering Swedish student performance is high in 
international perspective, these minor increases could be considered good results. Moreover, 
while spending on education as a percentage of GDP has increased overall, the proportion of 
this dedicated to the compulsory years of primary and secondary schooling has declined 
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relatively, indicating an efficiency improvement or at least maintenance. These costs and 
achievements may be ambiguous, however, as the independent systems of grading for free 
schools have been criticised for ‘grade inflation’ (Bunar, 2010: 12). Despite this, parents of free 
school students, like those of voucher participants in the United States, have been 
overwhelmingly satisfied with their school choice, and the voucher program overall has long 
enjoyed the support of many parents groups (Bunar, 2010: 5). There have, however, been early 
reports in the last twelve months of decreased faith in free schools, widely attributed to grade 
inflation (Orange, 2011; Holst, 2011; Martin, 2012). The impact of the free schools on students’ 
performance remains unclear, but according to these reports, citizens and some government 
ministers are calling for greater governance of school evaluation and reporting procedures to 
address this issue. 
 
The Swedish voucher schemes’ questionable impact upon student performance is mirrored by 
their contested outcomes in terms of equality and integration. The residential zoning 
requirements for admission into schools in certain municipalities have been identified as the 
main catalyst for the segregation of low-income migrants and ethnic minorities into separate, 
mostly public schools, due to the spatial concentration of these groups in cultural enclaves 
within urban areas (Wiborg, 2010: 14-5; Bunar 2010: 9). Migrant and first generation Swedish 
students are actually over-represented in free school enrolments, but are predominantly the 
children of high-skilled migrants, living in wealthier areas where free schools are primarily 
located (Wiborg, 2010: 11). In suburban areas where schools are obliged to accept all students, 
social integration in both public and free schools is much more comparable. However, there are 
significantly fewer free schools in suburban and rural municipalities. Minority-group students 
who travel from the outskirts of urban areas to more elite schools in the city centres are found to 
still socialise primarily with students from their own area, rather than experiencing greater 
social integration, and as more disadvantaged students move to predominantly Swedish-born 
schools, Swedish-born students are more likely to leave (Bunar, 2010: 10).  
 
The growing cultural divide between these groups seems to reflect the problematic hierarchy of 
tastes which Wilkinson and Pickett (2010: 163-6) describe as exacerbating economic inequality. 
Cultural difference is compounded by the lack of incentive that schools predominantly 
composed of Swedish-born students experience to accept migrant and minority students, 
although the flat-rate value of Swedish vouchers has probably endured due to political support 
for universalism in the context of social egalitarianism (Bjorklund et al, 2005: 28). It is 
important to remember that these patterns of social segregation are statistically significant, but 
small compared with the levels of segregation and inequality between schools which are present 
in the American education system. Swedish socio-economic segregation, and achievement 
differentials between municipalities and between schools, are very low in international 
perspective (Bjorklund et al, 2005; Wiborg, 2010: 18). Moreover, although inequality has 
grown in Sweden for a variety of reasons including demographic change and neoliberalising 
processes such as financialisation, after-tax inequality in Sweden is still significantly lower than 
in the USA [see table 3.5]. The demographic composition of Swedish cities has changed since 
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the introduction of the voucher scheme, and these patterns reflect a need for policies which go 
beyond the abolition of residential zoning rules. The broader problem of cultural segregation of 
migrants is one which can not be dealt with entirely through education funding policy. 
However, it seems clear that Swedish flat-rate vouchers, tied to the historic egalitarianism of the 
nation’s welfare state history, have been insufficiently responsive to the changing 
demographics, social structures, and notably increasing socio-economic inequality over the last 
twenty years.  
 
The Netherlands 
In comparison, the Dutch system of quasi-vouchers has been far more responsive to structural 
change throughout its longer history. The Dutch system of school funding evolved around the 
turn of the twentieth century, in a drawn-out ‘battle for the schools’ where a large religious 
population fought for equal funding of schools both public and private; secular and religious. 
The system which has evolved [see table 3.4] can not explicitly be described as employing 
vouchers, as government funding goes directly to schools for payroll, infrastructure, and 
educational resources, rather than to students or parents as an entitlement. However, funding 
varies on a per pupil basis, and the system is widely accepted and discussed as voucher-like in 
design and nature, shaped by the dynamics of consumer choice and exit (Daniels & Trebilcock, 
2005; James, 1984; Justesen, 2002). Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, changes to 
the Dutch system over time reflect adaptations to favourable and unfavourable outcomes, 
offering lessons for the design of voucher schemes internationally. This section will consider 
the differences in the Dutch scheme derived from its conservative origins, the ways in which 
equity concerns have emerged and been addressed over time, and the impacts of enhanced 
competition on the education system over all. 
 
Table 3.4 Dutch quasi-vouchers 
Student Eligibility All students 
School Eligibility All schools 
Regulation of Private schools Centralised curriculum, testing, and inspections; teacher accreditation. 
Negotiation of teacher 
remuneration National wage setting 
Can schools charge additional 
fees? 
Yes; limited to the cost of additional facilities (eg. swimming 
pools) 
Can schools deny entry? No  
Transport costs included? Yes 
How is information provided to 
parents?  Centralised evaluation, collection and dissemination 
Voucher value Graded , according to socio-economic background & geographical disadvantage  
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Conservatism 
The most marked aspect of the Dutch education system, which differentiates it from both the 
America and Swedish examples, is its sharp differentiation or ‘pillarisation’ along religious 
lines, into schools of secular, protestant, and catholic association. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, this segregation was usual in the private provision of welfare goods, 
including social services and health care, and reflects the Netherlands’ conservative origins as a 
country where religious power dominated early welfare state reform (James, 1984: 605-7). The 
public funding of private religious schools was accepted in the 1917 Constitution due to the 
reach of religious power. Liberal intellectuals championing the virtues of a common moral 
secular education were not populists, but a disconnected elite (Hooker, 2009: viii; 27). Dutch 
social conservatism has made segregation, both systematic and as a result of public choice, 
more acceptable as an outcome of the education funding scheme. Like much of central Europe, 
students in the Netherlands are separated from age twelve into four educational ‘tracks’, 
designed to provide the student with vocational training, ‘lower general’ education, ‘upper 
general’ education, or  prepare them for university. Students are free to choose between tracks, 
and schools may offer more than one ‘track’ in the same institution (OECD, 1994: 69). This 
segmentation occurs identically in both public and private schools. Its primary impact in 
relation to school funding is that parents seeking an elite education for their child need not send 
them to expensive private schools, as segregation of students according to merit or work ethic is 
systematic in both the public and private sectors (James, 1984: 621-2). 
 
Equity 
The impact of the Netherlands’ voucher-like funding scheme by the middle of the twentieth 
century was to further segregate populations along denominational, socio-economic and racial 
lines. Parents were most likely to choose an educational track for their child’s schooling which 
mirrored their own experience, meaning that the children of educated, financially well-off 
parents were likely to reproduce this pattern of socio-economic dominance generationally 
(James, 1984). Foreign-born children, mostly Morroccan and Turkish immigrants, had difficulty 
integrating as an ethnic minority, and were heavily concentrated in public schools running low-
track programs (OECD, 1994: 95). Moreover, performance in national testing was lower, 
adjusting for track, for students from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Ritzen et al, 1997: 
330). These impacts, at their height in the early 1960s, starkly mirror some of the problems that 
have emerged from both the American and Swedish systems. Demographic change in the 
Netherlands occurred much earlier than in Sweden, and adaptations to the education system 
were made to address the systemic inequalities which had emerged. 
 
From the 1960s and 70s, the regulative character of the universal funding unit allocated to 
Dutch students was significantly changed, to reflect its contemporary form as described in table 
3.4. Funding has since been allocated according to students’ socio-economic background, so 
that the poorest students receive 190% of the value of funding as the best-off (Justesen, 2002: 
21). Private schools are limited to charging minimal fees to students only for facilities, such as 
swimming pools and library extensions, which are not covered by government funding (James, 
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1984: 611). Public primary and secondary schools do not charge any fees to students, and 
failure to pay is legally no grounds for refused entry to a private school (Ritzen et al, 1997: 
333). By the 1990s, the spatial concentration of immigrant students in low-track public schools 
had reversed, as immigrant populations grew and residential zoning restrictions for schools were 
abolished (Barritt, 1996: 250). The free transportation of all students to school via a highly 
developed public transportation system has further contributed to integration, so that the social 
composition of students in public and private schools is no longer significantly different 
(Dronkers et al, 2001: 11). Low socio-economic background students are 1.72 times more likely 
than the average student to be low performers in the Netherlands, compared with an OECD 
average rate of 2.37 times (OECD, 2010). The character of regulation around Dutch quasi-
vouchers has not only produced greater integration in schools, but has also counteracted the 
potential cash-equivalency and regressiveness of its scheme. The potential advantage to families 
who would already have purchased private educate through personal means, to whom the 
subsidy is cash-equivalent, is counteracted by the larger level subsidy provided to lower-income 
and geographically disadvantaged families [see table 3.4]. Some scholars advocated targeted 
vouchers, such as those in the USA, to reduce the regressiveness of schemes in instances where 
the primary motive is to address inequality (Carnoy, 1998: 316). Universal schemes with graded 
funding units, however, act to equalise opportunities by encouraging socio-economic 
integration, while limiting the potential stigma associated with voucher limited to a particular 
group (Daniels & Trebilcock, 2005: 165). 
 
The impacts of competition 
Since Friedman’s appraisal in the 1950s and 60s, education vouchers have increasingly been 
viewed as a means by which to enhance the productive efficiency and quality of schooling, 
through the dynamic of competition. From around the same time the focus of school choice in a 
rapidly de-pillarising Netherlands gradually shifted from freedom of religious education to 
quality of education (Hooker, 2009). As quality and performance became more important to 
parents, competition between schools to attract students intensified. The number of private 
schools in the Netherlands has grown significantly since 1917, leading to a highly competitive 
system of relatively smaller schools. The growth in the number of schools is in part due to the 
fact that the Dutch quasi-voucher system is complemented by a number of municipal grants to 
new schools, for start-up costs such as building infrastructure. In order to qualify for these 
grants, potential school administrators must prove a desire or need for a new school, of a 
particular style, in the community. Moreover, to stay in operation, a minimum number of 
students must remain enrolled in the school. In the early-1990s, the Dutch government increased 
the minimum number of students required to receive funding, prompting reactions from school 
administrations to actively differentiate themselves in order to attract more students. In the city 
of Haarlem, one school discontinued its second track to foster a more elite reputation, while 
another offering all four tracks sought to emphasise this mixed, less formal atmosphere as well 
as its excellent performance in music (OECD, 1994: 95-6). In one sense, this dynamic reflects 
the adjustment of school focus in response to the demands of student and parental choice, but it 
might also be interpreted as a misallocation of scarce education resources, representing 
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inefficiency in the system. The trade-off between school responsiveness and school marketing 
complicates voucher scheme design. Where mechanisms exist to ensure that schools respond to 
a genuine need or prevalent taste in the community, and that parents receive unbiased 
information about school choice options, potential inefficiencies or wastes of resources are 
minimised. 
 
The method by which school information reaches students or parents as consumers, and the 
equitability of this process, is a key component of voucher scheme design. In the Netherlands, 
the operation of private schools is subject to more oversight than in either the American or 
Swedish case. This oversight allows for the transmission of relatively objective information 
about schools, based on a standard scale of centralised assessment. In order to receive 
government funding, all schools in the Netherlands must comply with a national curriculum and 
standardised testing, with a minimum required standard (Justesen, 2002: 17-8). Since the mid-
1990s, school rankings in tests and other school information has been publically published, in 
an effort to minimise the search costs of school choice for students and parents. Since these 
scores have been published, there has been a statistically significant response to results in terms 
of school enrolments (Koning & Van der Weil, 2010). Since the rise of standardised testing in 
western democracies, some critics have highlighted that published results, and results which 
determine funding, can cause unhealthy teaching behaviours popularly known as teacher 
‘cheating’ or ‘teaching to the test’, which do not contribute to long term educational outcomes, 
contributing to waste and inefficiency in the school system (Jacob, 2005; Jacob & Levitt, 2003a; 
2003b). Given that funding is allocated to schools on a strictly per pupil basis, test results only 
indirectly affect funding. Though a link has been found between school performance and 
enrolment numbers, given the relatively small capacity of most Dutch schools and the multitude 
of taste-based factors that enter into school choice decisions, we could extrapolate that such 
‘cheating’ behaviours are less prevalent than in systems where funding has been more directly 
related to test scores. The Netherlands has produced test results above, and educational 
attainment averages comparable with average OECD scores, which indicates that learning is of 
a reasonable standard, although a recent OECD report suggests that more guidance for parents 
and students to make correct school choices could increase educational attainment and reduce 
grade repetition (Justesen, 2002: OECD, 2012a). The Dutch government’s active role in the 
oversight of schools and information dispersion reflects the historical role of the state in the 
creation of markets, forging the institutional framework for exchange to take place. While great 
value is placed on consumer choice, individual students and their parents are not left with sole 
responsibility for the risks of information gathering and participation in the school market. 
 
The Dutch case demonstrates that per-pupil government finance, combined with regulation of 
supply and direction of consumption designed to pursue substantive equality goals, can produce 
an equitable education system which is more responsive to the choices and tastes of students 
and their parents. Proponents of the Friedmanite voucher approach have viewed the complex 
regulative structure around Dutch quasi-vouchers as a hindrance to innovation and efficiency 
improvements (James, 1984; Justesen, 2002). This characterisation of vouchers as an efficiency-
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driven policy tool is flawed, and ignores the realities of policy design which indicate that all 
voucher schemes are characterised by state direction of education, through some level of 
regulation and oversight. This oppositional attitude to regulation is not only unrealistic, but also 
obscures the potential of vouchers as a policy tool for strengthening substantive freedom 
through regulative systems which prioritise equality goals. 
 
Comparative insights 
In sum, it is pertinent to highlight some of the key insights from the comparison of voucher 
schemes in the United States, Sweden and the Netherlands [see table 3.5]. These insights help 
identify not only the pertinent trade-offs in voucher scheme design, but also the key areas of 
relevance for potentially progressive welfare reform through education vouchers. 
 
Transport and search costs 
Government responsibility for student transport to school and additional search costs associated 
with school choice is essential for the creation of free and fair terms of choice, and more 
equitable outcomes. The USA, Sweden and Netherlands have divergent policies on 
transportation and search costs [see table 3.5]. Government subsidies for transport were found to 
increase integration and equity in the Cleveland voucher scheme in the United States, and likely 
contributed to similar outcomes in the Dutch national voucher scheme. The Dutch policy of 
universal government funding for the cost of school transportation through the nationwide 
public transport system is arguably most equitable, although perhaps more feasible in a 
geographically small nation such as the Netherlands, than in America, due to obvious 
differences in the spatial constraints of open enrolment. Search costs are an equally important 
consideration for enhancing substantive freedom and equity. In the United States, the parents of 
voucher students, while low-income-earners, were likely to be more educated than the parents 
of low income students who did not take up school vouchers. Similarly, in Sweden, parents who 
made an active school choice were more likely to be Swedish born or high-skilled migrants, 
who had higher incomes and possessed more local knowledge from cultural integration. The 
dissemination of unbiased information about schools to all parents, and the existence of local 
support networks to aid in the choice process, are both also crucial for equalising access to the 
opportunities of school choice, and helping students to make the right choice for them, to 
increase educational attainment. 
 
Residential zoning and integration 
Open enrolment encourages greater socio-economic integration by breaking down spatial 
inequalities. Restrictions on the movement of students to schools in different localities have 
been shown to exacerbate inequality and social segregation in Sweden, resulting in the 
concentration of children of new lower-skill migrants in public schools in urban areas [see 
‘outcomes’ in table 3.5]. The Netherlands’ system of open enrolment and random selection of 
students over-subscribing to particular schools has contributed to higher levels of integration. 
More integration was seen in private schools significantly comprised of voucher students in 
Cleveland, but the structure of the voucher schemes, which allows students to choose between  
45 
 
Table 3.5 International Voucher Scheme Comparison 
 USA Sweden Netherlands 
Gini Coefficient 
1990 Pre/After Tax 0.45/0.348 0.408/0.209 0.474/0.292 
Gini Coefficient  
Late 2000s 
Pre/After Tax8 
0.486/0.378 0.426/0.259 0.426/0.284 
Student Eligibility Low-income, disabled, special needs students  
All compulsory-schooling-
aged students (7-16) Universal 
School Eligibility 
Private schools only; 
Religious schools 
excluded in some States  
All public and private 
schools 
All public and private 
schools 
Regulation of 
Private schools  
Minimum safety 
standards  (Centralised 
curriculum, testing and 
inspections in 
Milwaukee, since 2011)  
National ‘goal-setting’, 
municipal inspections, 
standardised testing in final 
compulsory year 
Centralised curriculum, 
testing, and inspections; 
teacher accreditation. 
Negotiation of 
teacher 
remuneration 
Individual negotiation at 
the school level 
Individual negotiation at 
the school level National wage setting 
Can schools charge 
additional fees?  
Yes, unlimited  
(restricted in Milwaukee 
and Cleveland) 
No Yes, limited to the cost of additional facilities  
Admission zones?  No Yes; varies between municipalities No 
Can schools deny 
entry?  
Some; varies between 
programs  
Some; In Stockholm and 
for ‘profile’ schools  No  
Transport costs 
included? 
Some; varies between 
programs  No Yes 
How is information 
provided to 
parents?  
Schools market 
themselves (Milwaukee 
since 2011, standardised 
test results published) 
School self-assessment and 
reporting, public 
dissemination 
Centralised evaluation, 
collection and 
dissemination 
Voucher value Standardised (except Cleveland) 
Standardised, flat-rate 
within municipalities  
Graded , according to 
socio-economic 
background & 
geographical disadvantage  
Outcomes  
Social and racial 
integration higher in the 
scheme where the cost of 
transport was covered, 
and vouchers graded 
 
Parents of voucher 
students more educated 
than low-income  parents 
of public school students 
 
Private and public 
schools perform equally 
well when data is adjust 
for student background, 
and poorer students are 
the lowest performers in 
both sectors 
New migrants are 
concentrated in public 
schools in urban areas 
 
Schools have altered 
curriculum and ‘profile’ to 
attract new students 
 
Public and private schools 
perform equally well in 
final year exams 
 
Students in private schools 
vary between 0 and 25% in 
different municipalities, 
but public school ‘choice’ 
is twice as common.  
Public and private schools 
have a similar social and 
racial mix 
 
Schools have actively 
altered teaching methods, 
special concentrations and 
tracks  to attract new 
students  
 
Public and private schools 
perform equally well 
 
70% of students now 
attend private schools 
                                                   
8 OECD (2012b) 
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private schools but not public, and encourages the ‘opting out’ of private schools with higher 
fees [see table 3.5], may limit overall integration. The relatively under-studied incidence of 
‘public school choice’ in Sweden indicates that open enrolment in public schools may be as 
important for enhancing choice as vouchers for private schools. The United States system seems 
to be based on the assumption that private schools are superior public, but school performance, 
adjusted for students’ socio-economic background, is similar. In both the Netherlands and 
Sweden, public and private schools perform equally well. This evidence in combination 
indicates that choice between both public and private schools beyond the local area, as pursued 
in the Netherlands, may offer better results than simply lifting the poorest students out of 
perceived public school ‘ghettos’. 
 
School differentiation, responsiveness and marketing 
If the chief benefits of choice are to be derived from school responsiveness to student and 
teacher tastes and needs, the creation of new schools and existing school differentiation is a 
primary concern. In Sweden and the Netherlands, the dynamic of competition has influenced the 
behaviour of schools, which have actively altered programs to attract more students [see 
‘outcomes’ in table 3.5], by focussing in special areas such as music or sport. In the 
Netherlands, schools use their selection of ‘tracks’ to attract a broader range, or in some cases 
only an elite group, of students. In Sweden schools have more autonomy over changes in 
curriculum and teaching content. In both countries, schools are marketed to students, which 
could be viewed as a misdirection of public resources away from actual teaching. However, this 
information process is essential for the operation of school markets, and where individual tastes 
and needs are more diverse, like in the Netherlands, may contribute to the most efficient, and 
more equitable, outcomes. The lack of emphasis in the American system on the responsiveness 
of schools represents a weakness in its system. 
 
We can see from the comparison in this chapter that education vouchers are sometimes, perhaps 
often, capable of exacerbating existing socio-economic inequalities. However, insights from the 
different experiences in the Unites States, and the success of the Dutch system, indicate that 
vouchers also have the potential to break down inequality, if the character of state regulation 
and oversight actively addresses these equity concerns. None of the education voucher schemes 
currently in use can be described as very similar to the proposal first outlined by Milton 
Friedman. However, those which concentrate on Friedmanite formal equality of opportunity, or 
equality of treatment, fail to address systemic inequalities and therefore fall short of enhancing 
individuals’ substantive freedoms. This chapter has shown that the character of ongoing state 
involvement in the shape of education voucher policy can produce radically different results, 
which challenge the characterisation of vouchers as a the retreat of the state, and also give hope 
for the prospects of social democratic reformist vouchers, designed to enhance substantive 
equality and freedom, and reverse rather than extend the processes of neoliberalisation. These 
prospects, and the particular challenges of implementing reform in nations as diverse as the 
United States of America and Sweden, will be elaborated in the following chapter, where a 
social democratic reformist voucher is proposed. 
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4. Vouchers reconsidered 
The prospects for social democratic reform 
This paper has argued that the dominant conception of education vouchers as entailing the 
retreat of the state is misleading, and that vouchers as a policy of actually existing neoliberalism 
have always entailed an ongoing role for the state in the public direction of education 
consumption. The previous chapter demonstrated that while some voucher schemes, informed 
by the Friedmanite philosophy of limited equality of opportunity, may exacerbate existing 
inequalities and drive neoliberalisation, others have the potential to foster more substantive 
equality and freedom, depending on the character of the state’s direction of education through 
regulation and oversight. This chapter argues, given an improved understanding of vouchers as 
publicly-directed consumption, that education vouchers have the potential be recast and used to 
pursue social democratic reform, to help reverse rather than reinforce neoliberalising processes 
in relatively unequal capitalist societies such as the United States of America. The chapter 
begins with a critique of the limitations of Third Way voucher reforms, arguing that they 
amount to a continuation of neoliberal ideologies, and goes on to present a pragmatic proposal 
for social democratic education voucher reform, informed by a framework of positive liberty 
and substantive equality. The third section justifies the voucher proposal offered, as compared 
with publicly-provided school choice alternatives, as a pragmatic strategy for progressive 
reform in nations such as the United States, where neoliberalism is quite entrenched, supported 
both discursively and by vested interests. 
 
The limitations of ‘Third Way’ vouchers 
Before elaborating the potential for voucher schemes as progressive policy tools for reversing 
the processes of neoliberalisation, it is important to differentiate the understanding of social 
democratic reform which informs this paper from that which is embodied in the ‘quasi-market’ 
literature of the Third Way. The neoclassical approach to welfare provision has been adapted, if 
not revolutionised, by Third Way scholars since the 1990s, who champion a compromise 
between free market economics and state socialism, advancing the importance of consumer 
choice alongside the ‘guiding hand’ of government. Most influential in Britain, but also tied to 
the Clinton administration in America, as well as governments in Australia and Canada, the 
Third Way emerged in reaction to the New Right policies of deregulation, privatisation, and 
fiscal conservatism, in a attempt to incorporate these now-dominant neoliberal economic 
strategies with the goals of social justice. Giddens (1998) refers to the Third Way as a ‘renewal 
of social democracy’, in response to the pluralism generated by globalisation and individualism 
which has undermined the ‘old-style’ social democratic goals of solidarity and equality. This 
centrist revival is broadly concerned with equality of opportunity, and combating exclusion 
from ‘the mainstream of opportunities society has to offer’ (Giddens, 1998: 102-3; 2000: 86-9). 
The kind of ‘equality of opportunity’ which informs the Third Way, however, is the limited, 
formal variety which does not significantly differ from that to which Friedman subscribes. The 
primarily rationale for the voucher-like ‘quasi-markets’ advocated by prominent Third Way 
economist Julian Le Grand (2007: 41) mirrors that offered by Friedman, based on the 
equalisation of differential purchasing power to choose between providers. Like Friedman, Le 
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Grand (2007: 37) prioritises quality, efficiency and choice as policy goals. The satisfaction of 
equality goals for the Third Way demands only the creation of ‘non-preferential access’ to 
services, amounting to limited, formal equality, or equality of treatment. To their credit, Third 
Way scholars have a deeper conception of the idea of freedom, in terms of personal autonomy 
and ‘freedom to achieve’ (Giddens, 2000: 88), than that provided by Friedman’s negative liberty 
perspective. However, the Third Way makes little attempt to depart from the inadequate 
normative framework of formal equality and the limiting axioms of neoclassical economics. As 
in neoclassical theory, the welfare state is depicted as a ‘pooling of risk’, investing in human 
capital and self-help policies (Giddens, 1998: 110-6), which are seen to minimise the 
opportunity cost of welfare provision by way of Pareto improvements (Le Grand, 2007: 9). By 
placing emphasis on instrumentalist choice and personal responsibility, the Third Way accepts 
the neoliberal arrangements of a meritocracy, which, as even Giddens (1998: 101-6) himself 
observes, likely lead to increasing income disparity and greater inequality.  
 
Table 4.1 Le Grand’s voucher proposal 
 
Third Way policy proposals also extend neoliberalising processes by privileging market-
oriented logics which prioritise the value of profitability over and above broader social goals 
such as equality. This tendency is clearly demonstrated in Le Grand’s (1989; 2007) depiction of 
a ‘left-wing voucher education scheme’, designed with the stated goal of creating equality of 
opportunity, but severely limited by its commitment to free terms of production. In fairness, Le 
Grand (1989: 200; 2007: 80-4) recognises the need for governments to subsidise the search 
costs of information collection, as well as transportation costs, especially to poorer families, of 
moving children to distant schools [see table 4.1]. He accepts a level of state regulation of 
curricular content and school testing which would facilitate the process of information 
collection and dissemination. However, Le Grand’s preoccupation with the freedom of 
enterprise leads him to dismiss the prospect of fee regulation, which would prevent ‘topping-up’ 
by wealthy families, as well as restrictions upon the ability of schools to select particular 
students and in effect ‘cream skim’ the most desirable (Le Grand, 2007: 146-8). Le Grand 
Student eligibility All elementary and secondary school students 
School eligibility All schools in compliance with regulations 
Regulation of private schools 
Safety standards and inspections, common curriculum, 
standardised testing 
Negotiation of teacher remuneration Individual negotiation at the school level 
Can schools charge additional fees? Yes 
Admission zones? No 
Can schools deny admission? Yes 
Transport costs included? Yes 
How is information provided to 
parents? 
Public dissemination and guidance available to parents. 
Voucher value 
Graded, with higher value for residents of poorer areas 
(post code classification) 
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(2007:147) views restrictions on fees and admissions as ‘demoralising’ to schools, suggesting 
that rather than promoting substantive equality they simply encourage evasion of the regulations 
by schools. He also supports the freedom of schools to negotiate staffing contracts and allocate 
budgets (Le Grand, 2007: 29); a process which has contributed to growing differences in 
teaching standards, for example, as was noted in the previous chapter in the case of Sweden 
(Bjorklund, et al, 2005: 173-4).  
 
Le Grand (2007: 148) promotes a system designed to ‘incentivise’ schools to select low-income 
students, through a graded or ‘positively discriminating voucher’, with higher subsidies 
allocated to students living in low-income postcodes. He asserts that cream-skimming in favour 
of better-off students will be ‘reduced or eliminated’ under this system of incentives, as schools 
will select either predominantly low-income students, or a mix of students, in order to garner 
higher levels of funding. Le Grand, however, ignores the dynamic instilled by the deregulation 
of fees, by which schools are able to charge high levels of additional fees above the value of the 
voucher to well-off students, effectively locking out low-income earners. Given that, under Le 
Grand’s scheme, schools are also allowed to select students at will, the result would likely be a 
highly divided system with similar, if not worsened, levels of segregation and achievement 
differentials than exist in current systems of mixed public and private finance and provision. 
Moreover, his system of voucher grading based on post code classification is contradictory, and 
poorly justified. Le Grand (2007: 148-9) opposes additional funding to schools in remote areas 
on grounds of geographic disadvantage, as he insists that the location of schools does not reflect 
the socio-economic background of their students. If this justification is to be taken as 
reasonable, classifying family income based on residence in a predominantly poor area would 
seem equally short-sighted. Le Grand (2007: 149) opposes means-testing to determine voucher 
allocation, as he views the bureaucratic processes around means-testing as ineffective and 
inefficient. Regardless of the potential flaws in the processes, most liberal welfare states have 
pre-existing systems of means-testing for other forms of welfare benefit, and Le Grand’s 
diagnosis of inefficiency disregards the possibility of incorporating voucher allocation into these 
existing, albeit imperfect processes. Le Grand’s efficiency-driven approach, which is shaped 
primarily by a commitment to free terms of production, does not present a realistic policy for 
social democratic education voucher reform, but rather a continuation of neoliberal  ideals. 
Marxian theorist Alex Callinicos (2001: 121) asserts, in his fierce critique of both the 
ideological underpinnings and policy regimes of the Third Way, that, ‘far from breaking with 
the neoliberal policies of the New Right, [the Third Way] has continued and, in certain ways, 
radicalised them.’ Third Way perspectives extend and legitimate neoliberalisation, and far from 
a ‘renewal’ of social democracy, they rather regrettably neglect the movement’s fundamental 
equity goals. 
 
Social democratic reformist vouchers 
This section presents a voucher scheme proposal [see table 4.2], designed according to the 
social democratic goals of substantive equality of opportunity, and social integration, that may 
help to reverse the effects of neoliberalisation in unequal nations such as the United States of 
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America. Social democratic reformist vouchers should repeal the state’s extension of market-
oriented logics in education, by prioritising equality goals over profitability and freedom of 
production. They should combat growing inequality, and disadvantage concentrated in the non-
owning classes and ethnic minorities, by empowering these groups with genuine freedom and 
choice, and lifting them with higher level benefits. Moreover, they should act to challenge the 
neoliberal ideologies which obscure this systemic inequality and un-freedom which pervades 
the neoliberalised world. In America, between 1979 and 2005, the top 0.1% of households 
enjoyed over 20% of after-tax income gains, while only 13.5% increase was shared amongst the 
bottom 60% of households (Hacker & Pierson, 2010: 8). In Australia by the mid-2000s, the top 
quintile of households earned an average of more than four times as much as those in the bottom 
quintile, and the top 50% of households held over 90% of household wealth (Stilwell & Jordan, 
2007: 4-5). The proposal outlined below is by no means a panacea. The social problems which 
have emerged and intensified in neoliberal capitalist nations must be addressed through 
multiple, complex policy regimes. Vouchers of this nature are presented simply as one strategic 
tool, in education, through which states might pursue a more equitable set of policy outcomes, 
which pragmatically deals with the path dependent features and vested interests of existing 
systems in nations such as the United States. This section will proceed by describing the key 
components of possible social democratic reformist vouchers, with specific reference to issues 
of universalism, and equity and integration. 
 
Table 4.2 Proposal for social democratic reformist education vouchers 
 
 
Student eligibility 
Universal; all elementary and secondary school 
students 
School eligibility 
All schools, public and private, in compliance with 
regulations 
Regulation of private schools 
Safety standards and inspections, common curriculum, 
teacher accreditation and salaries, fee regulation 
Negotiation of teacher remuneration National/State wage scales. 
Can schools charge additional fees? No 
Admission zones? No 
Can schools deny admission? 
No, admission by lot for oversubscription (potentially 
subject to entrance tests for academically or otherwise 
selective schools in systems which condone them) 
Transport costs included? Yes 
How is information provided to 
parents? 
Performance assessment by government, as well by a 
school-based body of teachers and parents. Public 
dissemination and guidance available to parents. 
Voucher value 
Graded according to socio-economic background and 
special needs (means-tested); probably higher than 
current per-pupil spending on education 
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Universalism 
Universal vouchers are superior to those restricted to low income students, as they both reduce 
the stigma associated with voucher use, and offer a more egalitarian policy structure which is 
also likely to attract wider political support. They address the concern of parents whose children 
are currently enrolled in privately-funded schooling, of ‘paying twice’ for education, through 
both taxation and private tuition (Friedman, 1955; Jencks, 1966; Chubb & Moe 1990). 
Universal vouchers also allow policy-makers to influence (and force them to consider) the 
whole structure of the education system, including both public and private providers, rather than 
falling into the trap, characteristic of American voucher schemes, of simply plucking 
disadvantaged students out of an apparently-failing public system. For these reasons, reformist 
voucher should be characterised by universal student eligibility [see table 4.2]. There are, 
however, design challenges which emerge from universal vouchers. Parents whose tastes call 
for more elitist institutions, and schools who seek to provide such, are likely to work within a 
universal system to create these conditions. Fee deregulation and unlimited ‘topping-up’ of 
vouchers, as featured in most of the American voucher schemes presented in the previous 
chapter, allows schools to increase tuition above the level of the voucher, restricting entry to the 
well off. In order to prevent this practise, universal vouchers should go hand in hand with 
regulation of fees, so that no school can charge for admission above the value of the standard 
voucher. Wolf (2012) has noted the importance of stricter regulation of fees and admissions for 
maintaining equity in the expanding Milwaukee scheme, as it approaches a more universal 
system. 
 
Of course, where regulations restrict fee charges, it is possible that schools will ‘opt out’ of the 
voucher system, accepting no public funds but charging expensive fees to wealthy students. The 
benefits of opting out are reduced the higher the value of the standard level voucher, but it is 
likely that a small percentage of parents and educators will pursue this option. The possibility of 
outlawing opting-out, that is, applying voucher funding to all schools in the system to the 
exclusion of privately-financed education, may represent a more egalitarian option, but would 
likely struggle to be implemented given the influential vested interests of, for example, private 
school lobbies. Like in the Netherlands, it may be desirable to allow small fee charges for 
additional school facilities such as swimming pools and sports grounds, which would make a 
fee-restricted voucher scheme more attractive to existing high-fee private schools whose current 
per-pupil expenditure could not be feasibly matched by a government-funded voucher. 
Moreover, if the standards within the voucher system were lifted, there would be less leakage 
from the system, in that only a small minority of parents and schools would likely opt out to 
attend elitist institutions. Baldwin (1990: 30) asserts that the historical success of social policy 
in the Scandinavian welfare states was their provision of services, to the standard expected by 
the wealthy and middle classes, to all. This kind of strategic approach both appeases vested 
interests, and fosters what Baldwin (1990: 35) refers to as ‘social solidarity’, wherein ‘all must 
potentially be affected both as recipients and givers’, reflecting an essential universalist 
component of solidaristic welfare. Overall, a voucher scheme which regulated fees for those 
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schools which accepted voucher funding, but allowed opting out for the small minority, would 
still decrease inequality in existing systems of liberal welfare states like America and Australia.  
 
A further challenge arises from the question of potentially desirable elitism, in the context of 
academically selective schools which, for example, prepare students for tertiary admission. In 
the Netherlands, the segregation of students within schools into ‘tracks’ to some extent prevents 
the demand for elite schools, as students are already divided according to ability. In a school 
system that doesn’t have academic tracks, the likelihood of elitist schools emerging is higher, 
which enhances the need for preventative regulation. Whether selectivity on merit is desirable in 
a school system is a much larger question beyond the scope of this paper, but it is relevant to 
say that any system which does select on ability should be prevented from also selecting on the 
basis of income, and that socio-economic integration should remain a primary goal of the 
system overall, given the advantages of integration described in the previous chapter, in 
breaking down discriminatory tastes. 
 
Equity and Integration 
This paper has previously defended the pursuit of substantive equality of opportunity, as 
opposed to the limited, formal variety supported by Friedman and pursued by a number of 
existing American voucher schemes. A social democratic reformist voucher scheme would 
reflect substantive equality goals by grading voucher value according to socio-economic 
disadvantage, disability or special needs [see table 4.2]. As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, universal graded vouchers such as those in the Netherlands encourage greater socio-
economic integration, and provide an equalising boost to low income students by counter-acting 
the cash-equivalency of the standard vouchers provided to families with higher incomes. The 
previous chapter also elaborated the importance of government responsibility for transport 
costs, and the unbiased dissemination of school information to parents. These features are 
reflected in the proposal in table 4.2. The reformist voucher scheme would emulate the Dutch 
system of central school evaluation, but privilege also independent assessment of schools by 
teachers and parents in the information disseminated, in order to provide a balanced view. 
Support services, as suggested by the OECD (2012a), would be available to assist students and 
parents in making school choice decisions. It is essential to reiterate here that, while such 
ancillary services increase the cost of the education voucher system, they are essential for the 
operation of free choice, they contribute to the ability of parents and students to select schools 
which best reflect their personal tastes, and are more likely to provide greater educational 
attainment, contributing to overall efficiency. The previous chapter showed that such services in 
the Cleveland and Netherlands schemes also increased socio-economic integration in schools. 
The abolition of residential zoning requirements for admission would also aid in integration. 
The key equity components of these reformist vouchers do not simply provide non-preferential 
access to students to enter the school of their choice. Rather, they actively equalise pre-existing 
socio-economic disadvantage so that the uptake of school choice opportunities is more even, 
and students are more integrated within schools, with a view to breaking down discriminatory 
and hierarchical tastes, and increasing the egalitarianism of outcomes. 
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Schooling policy alternatives and vested interests 
The proposal presented above reflects the prospect revealed in chapter 3, that particular systems 
of state regulation around voucher schemes can produce more equitable outcomes than others. 
The purpose of designing a social democratic reformist voucher scheme is to achieve the best, 
and most egalitarian, outcomes from an education system divided between public and private 
provision. Given that the scheme described is likely to cost more per child than current rates of 
per-pupil expenditure, from a social democratic perspective the most reasonable 
counterproposition would be to simply channel the additional funds directly into public schools, 
to attract more students and out-compete the private sector, similar to the state of affairs in 
Sweden before the decentralisation and marketisation of provision in 1992. However, this paper 
takes the view that such a policy, while feasible in Sweden, runs blind to the path dependent 
development of the American welfare state, and that of other liberal democratic nations such as 
Australia, and ignores the vested interests, of parents, educators, and private providers, which 
represent a significant blockade to policies that fundamentally challenge the structure of the 
system. This proposal therefore reflects a strategic approach to achieving more egalitarian 
outcomes in the education systems of societies such as the USA and Australia, in which 
neoliberalism has been significantly entrenched, and the prospects for more traditional social 
democratic reform appear narrow. The approach does not represent a compromise on goals, as 
perhaps we might view Le Grand’s voucher system, but rather a compromise in the techniques 
or tools of reform. This section will elaborate this view, considering the influence of vested 
interests and policy drift in American politics, and the utility of social democratic reformist 
vouchers to address calls for choice while pursuing equity, above and beyond the utility of 
publicly-funded school policy options. 
 
The mechanism of policy drift and the resistance of vested interests have been identified as two 
of the key components of path dependency in the American liberal welfare state, contributing to 
the extension of its ‘residual’ nature, as the state responds less adequately to the emergence of 
new social risks and social problems (Pierson, 1994; Hacker, 2004). Policies ‘drift’ when 
dominant interests in the economy, usually business, property owners, and supporters of the 
extension of market logics, create “changes in the operation or effect of policies that occur 
without significant changes in those policies’ structure” by resisting substantive adaptations to 
address new social risks (Hacker, 2004: 246). Such processes make it more difficult to enact 
significant change in the pursuit of social democratic aims, because the further we move along a 
particular ‘path’ or direction of policy, the greater the ‘positive feedback’ or increasing returns 
are to staying on that path (Pierson, 2000). This dynamic, historically-informed view of 
economic change provides insight into how neoliberal ideologies have become so entrenched in 
nations such as America. The welfare state has clearly developed in path dependent ways, as 
policy-makers have created long-term institutions which are resistant to fundamental change 
(Pierson, 1994: 17).  
 
The introduction of vouchers in the USA from the 1990s represents a kind of policy drift where 
new policies are ‘layered’ on top of old; skeletal voucher schemes atop a pre-existing education 
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system, already fraught with inequality and differential outcomes. Unlike in the Netherlands, 
where the character of regulation around voucher schemes has adapted over time to address the 
emergence of new social risks and social problems, vouchers in America have followed the 
established residual approach. Vouchers were strongly resisted by a clearly identifiable group of 
teachers and other actors working within and supporting the public education sector (Levin, 
2002). Since their introduction in various states, the opposing interests of for-profit educational 
providers and their customers have been joined by a growing number of voucher-funded 
families who have, as noted in the previous chapter, been overwhelmingly satisfied with the 
schemes (Greene et al, 1996; Witte, 1998; Peterson et al, 1999; Levin, 2002; Wolf et al, 2009; 
Wolf, 2012). In order to address the systemic inequalities which have emerged, it is necessary to 
confront these vested interests with policy proposals which satisfy the demands for choice from 
parents and students, remain palatable to private providers, and satisfy the concerns of teacher 
unions for salary justice, so that salaries are not contingent on market forces [see table 4.2]. 
Simply out-competing the private sector by channelling extra funds into public schools is 
unrealistic in America and similar nations such as Australia, where private providers enjoy 
significant parental, business, and by extension political support, which resists systemic change. 
For example, following the recent announcement in the state of NSW of education finance 
freezes, which translate to real spending cuts in both the public and private sectors, the 
government sector has outlined a plan to cut at least 600 jobs from teaching and administrative 
staff (Patty, 2012). Conversely, private sector vested interests have resisted the change, with 
representatives from the Catholic and independent sectors meeting with Federal politicians in 
order to negotiate separate Federal funding to offset the State cuts (Taylor, 2012). The ability of 
such private vested interests to block policy change strengthens the need to appease these actors 
in the design of pragmatic policy alternatives, 
 
Some theorists have advanced publicly-provided policy alternatives, to address calls for choice 
from parents and students. Such alternatives, described as ‘public choice’ policies, while 
legitimate in theory, do not adequately address the vested interests within residual liberal 
welfare states. Levin (2002) has argued that education vouchers, in theory, do not necessarily 
provide more choice or more equitable outcomes than a system of public choice which 
differentiates state schooling into institutions of different primary focus; for example, for gifted 
students, performing arts, or technology. Critics of ‘public choice’ policies, often supporters of 
more market-oriented voucher schemes, argue that such systems remain limited by the inability 
of governments to perceive the specific tastes of consumers, and would result in the 
disequilibrium of school supply (Hill & Guinn, 2002). Chubb (2002) argues that schools will be 
resistant to demand-driven change because once the preferable school choices are full to 
capacity, students will be forced to enrol in ‘leftover’ schools and send the wrong kinds of 
messages to government providers. This logic, clearly indicative of neoclassical axiomatic ways 
of thinking, denies the potential for citizens and governments to engage in reasoned discussion. 
A process of consultation between governments, schools, students, parents and teachers could 
ensure that public choice reflects the interests of parents and students. This process could be 
expensive, and potentially less responsive to changes in student and parental preferences than a 
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voucher scheme. However, in societies where individual values are relatively more 
homogenous, such as Sweden, it may be a preferable method of offering choice with 
egalitarianism. As noted in chapter 3, the majority of students living in non-remote areas of 
Sweden with more than one school make some kind of active choice, enrolling in schools other 
than their local. However, choice occurs to a much lesser extent than in the Netherlands, and 
more often than not Swedish students choose to attend public schools. Valkama Bailey & Elliot 
(2010) argue that vouchers improve social welfare more significantly where the population has 
more diverse tastes. In the Netherlands and the USA, private education, and especially religious 
education, has historically played more of a role then in Sweden. Moreover, direct provision of 
public choice may not be as redistributive as a universal voucher scheme which offers higher 
value vouchers to disadvantaged students, so public choice would be more effective in societies 
like Sweden which already have high levels of after-tax equality [see table 3.5 in the previous 
chapter]. Neoliberalism remains less entrenched in Sweden compared with the United States, so 
the potential for publicly-provided choice is greater. In nations such as the United States and 
Australia, however, the prospects for reform which works outside the existing structure of 
provision divided between the public and private sector seem negligible.  
 
Conclusion 
The social democratic reformist vouchers described in this chapter are presented as a strategic 
policy, designed to satisfy calls for school choice and remain acceptable to influential private 
sector vested interests, while also pursuing more substantive equality of opportunity in 
schooling, toward more egalitarian educational outcomes. The policy delivered in table 4.2 
would clearly require a coalition of interests for implementation. However, its consideration of 
the practicality of pre-existing vested interests and the historical development liberal democratic 
welfare states makes the vouchers in question more viable as a solution to the systemic 
inequalities of the existing school system than publicly-provided choice options which may be 
more relevant in already more equal nations. Given that this paper has already demonstrated that 
all voucher schemes represent an approach of publicly-directed consumption, wherein the state 
is more heavily involved in the regulation and oversight of schooling than is often depicted, this 
proposal for social democratic reformist vouchers seems a workable solution to be potentially 
applied in nations such as America, Australia, and other liberal democratic welfare states 
characterised by both public and private provision. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to recast education vouchers as a potential tool for social democratic reform, 
guided by the pursuit of substantive equality of opportunity and positive freedom, toward more 
egalitarian educational outcomes. This task was undertaken by considering the ways in which 
voucher schemes are perceived to operate, and the logics which inform them, in theory, as well 
as their actual operation, and different design features and outcomes, in practice. 
 
The first chapter contextualised the existing literature on education vouchers, advancing the 
more marginal conception of education vouchers as a form of publicly-directed consumption, in 
opposition to their dominant depiction as the retreat of the state from its welfare role. It also 
suggested that the state’s ongoing direction of education under existing voucher schemes could 
be best understood by viewing vouchers as a policy instrument of ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’, wherein the extension of market logics is supported by a significant role for the 
state in the creation of markets, and also their re-regulation and oversight.  
 
The second chapter focussed on the theoretical underpinnings of neoliberal voucher schemes, 
significantly influenced by Milton Friedman’s depiction of vouchers. It revealed the logical 
inconsistencies in Friedmanite vouchers, and also their practical limitations. More broadly, the 
neoclassical approach to welfare economics, which informs neoliberal policy, was challenged in 
favour of the historical institutional perspective. The equality-efficiency trade-off, and the 
analytical separation of the state, market, and society, were rejected in favour of a more 
pragmatic approach to policy-making which recognises the embedded nature of the economy in 
both formal and informal social institutions, and the co-constitutive nature of institutions and 
individual values and behaviours, focussing on the more specific trade-offs which are relevant 
to policy design. 
 
The third chapter applied this historical institutional methodology in a comparative analysis of 
voucher schemes in the United States of America, Sweden, and the Netherlands. It showed that 
despite Friedman’s influential philosophical contribution to vouchers, few schemes closely 
resemble his policy prescriptions, and that those which are informed by the Friedmanite 
philosophy of equality of opportunity actually fail to provide enhanced equality or freedom, and 
tend to exacerbate existing socio-economic inequalities. These kinds of vouchers are constituent 
of the neoliberalising processes which have, in the last thirty years, transformed the role of the 
state to support the extension of market logics. Chapter 3 also illustrated the heterogeneous 
nature of voucher schemes, in both design and outcomes, dependent upon the character of state 
regulation. It clearly demonstrated the utility of the frame of ‘publicly-directed consumption’ by 
highlighting the ways in which regulation and oversight have shaped different voucher policies, 
and revealed the prospect for particular kinds of voucher schemes, which actively target and 
redress inequalities, to reverse rather than reinforce neoliberalising processes. 
 
The final chapter developed the insights from the preceding inquiry into vouchers in theory and 
practice, presenting a proposal for social democratic reformist vouchers informed by the pursuit 
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of positive liberty, social solidarity, and more substantive equality. This policy framework 
inverts the normative justification that has informed Friedmanite and neoliberal voucher 
schemes, recasting vouchers as policy tools to potentially work toward more egalitarian 
educational outcomes in unequal and highly neoliberalised nations such as the United States and 
Australia. The voucher proposal presented was justified as a pragmatic approach to policy 
design in nations where the path dependent development of the residual liberal welfare state 
calls for strategic policies which address the vested interests that resist significant structural 
change.  
 
The evidence and analysis provided in this thesis has by no means been exhaustive. Further 
research to inform a co-ordinated effort toward addressing inequality in educational 
opportunities is recommended. Undoubtedly, however, this paper has revealed that education 
vouchers can not be understood simply, and solely, as an instrument of neoliberalisation. The 
processes which have shaped the marketisation of education, and the problems which have 
emerged, have clearly been defined by the character of the state’s ongoing direction of both 
publicly- and privately-provided schooling. This opens up scope, in the limited range of liberal 
contexts described, for the strategic direction of mixed public and private provision toward the 
pursuit of social democratic goals. Education vouchers are worthy of further interrogation as a 
strategic policy tool, for reversing rather than reinforcing the effects of neoliberalism.  
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